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Abstract
A flexible methodology is developed to specify how a desired outcome can be reached in
a given conflict by determining the preference structures required for the decision makers
to find it stable. The objective of this methodology is to provide informed collective
negotiation support. This new methodology is generated by reverse engineering some
Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR) procedures and is therefore called “Inverse
GMCR”. The essence of Inverse GMCR is to determine whether and how a strategic
conflict can be ideally resolved, which may inform the mediators of strategies to achieve
this resolution.
Formal definitions and mathematical representations for the new Inverse GMCRmethod-
ology are formulated in this thesis. The four basic graph model stability definitions, Nash
stability (R), general metarationality (GMR), symmetric metarationality (SMR), and se-
quential stability (SEQ) are redefined for Inverse GMCR as Nash IPS, GMR IPS, SMR
IPS, and SEQ IPS, respectively where IPS stands for Inverse Preference Structure. Pattern
recognition and inverse calculations are used to generate strategies that permit mediators
to negotiate a desired resolution. Mediation, or third party intervention, is strengthened
by utilizing the insightful information provided by the Inverse GMCR methodology and
the negotiation support system.
An in-depth strategic investigation and analysis of a complex water conflict in the Mid-
dle East is carried out to test and refine the algorithms developed here. This conflict
occurred along the Euphrates River and had three key time points when the conflict esca-
lated to the brink of a full scale war, in 1975, 1990, and 1998. A comprehensive analysis of
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the conflict is undertaken, including bilateral and trilateral negotiations both before and
after mediation.
Based on the new Inverse GMCR and existing algorithms, an advanced decision support
system (DSS) is designed, built, and illustrated using real world conflicts. The new DSS,
called GMCR+, is capable of handling a wide variety of decision problems involving two
or more decision makers (DMs). Given the DMs, the options or courses of action available
to each of them, and each DM’s relative preferences over the scenarios or states that could
occur, GMCR+ can calculate stability and equilibrium results according to a range of
solution concepts that explain human behavior under conflict. Then the inverse component
of the DSS, GMCR+, can determine the preference rankings of DMs that produce stable
states and equilibria as specified by the user. Other features incorporated into GMCR+
include coalition analysis, graph and tree diagram visualization, narrative reporting of
results, and a tracing feature that shows how the conflict could evolve from a status quo
state to a desirable equilibrium or other specified outcome. The system GMCR+ has a
modular design in order to facilitate the addition of further advances.
The overarching purpose of this research is to provide a simple and intuitive methodol-
ogy to better understand and resolve actual conflicts. The GMCR+ DSS was developed in
order to implement the Inverse GMCR methodology in the context of the standard graph
model functions and in a practical way. Analysis and investigation of real world examples
demonstrate the applicability of the methodology in various domains.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
A dispute arises when two or more individuals or groups have conflicting interests, which
may arise in the context of economic relations, international trade, environmental man-
agement, interpersonal relationships, and elsewhere. For society to be sustainable, stake-
holders holding scarce resources or competitors in industrial development must reach ap-
propriate compromises. When several parties are involved, each with an interest in the
outcome of the conflict, decision makers (DMs) must select options under their control that
determine an outcome. Although each DM has some power over the outcome, no single
DM has full control. Moreover, when deadlock is reached in negotiations, a third party
may be needed to intervene in order to reach a just resolution.
Because conflict is so pervasive in society, a strategic conflict resolution and analysis
methodology may be employed to determine appropriate strategies. Earlier methodolo-
gies for modeling and analyzing conflict include metagame analysis (Howard, 1971, 1987),
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conflict analysis (Fraser and Hipel, 1984), drama theory (Howard, 1994a,b), and hyper-
game analysis of misperceptions (Bennett, 1980; Wang et al., 1988). The flexibility of the
Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR) constitutes an improvement over earlier
methodologies for the systematic resolution of real-world strategic conflicts (Kilgour and
Hipel, 2005). Standard GMCR application involves two main stages, modeling and analy-
sis, which will be outlined in Chapter 3 (Hipel et al., 1990). The modeling stage includes
determining the DMs, possible options, possible outcomes, and DMs’ preferences. In the
analysis stage, the possible equilibria or outcomes of the conflict are determined. Practi-
cal application of conflict resolution methodologies can require cumbersome data analysis
and iteration, which warrants the employment of a computerized decision support system
(DSS) to expedite calculation of strategic results for interpretation by analysts. This DSS,
for instance, could be used by a mediator to determine how disputants can reach a win/win
resolution.
1.1 Research Motivation
Conflicts are the most costly and dangerous of all social processes (Bercovitch and Gart-
ner, 2009). Conflict analysis algorithms can provide forecasting information according to
the conflict parameters. However, values of these parameters may be subjective or change
unexpectedly, resulting in a di↵erent outcome than the one initially predicted (Bristow
et al., 2012; Sebenius, 1992; Rangaswamy and Shell, 1997). The development of an ap-
proach to model negotiations with and without third party intervention in conflicts will
address the most crucial element of international relations, which is conflict, and the most
2
influential component of a conflict, which is negotiation (Bercovitch and Gartner, 2006,
2009). The framework of standard GMCR can be used to predict the likely outcomes of a
strategic conflict. However, understanding how a specific outcome can be reached within
a negotiation is a challenge that is not addressed in the standard GMCR methodology.
A survey of the literature, which will be presented in Chapter 2, reveals the need for
a comprehensive approach to model and analyze conflicts in order to determine strategies
that can achieve a desired resolution. Many existing studies on negotiation and mediation
address specific conflicts or sets of conflicts but end up using regression analysis, which
may be unreliable and di cult to apply.
A number of water conflicts involving a third party in the Middle East have been re-
cently investigated. The case studies emphasize the e↵ects of third party intervention in
bringing about a resolution (Hipel et al., 2014). The standard GMCR was used to model
and analyze the conflicts before and after third party intervention. The applications pro-
vided the motivation to seek a more comprehensive approach to formally model negotiation
and third party intervention within the framework of GMCR and to develop a software to
visualize the model and allow negotiators and mediators to analyze options that result in
an optimal resolution.
1.2 Research Objectives
This research provides a methodology that can generate scenarios regarding the likely
evolution of a conflict. Furthermore, the tool can allow an analyst to specify a desired
3
resolution and understand all scenarios that can achieve or avoid that specific resolution.
There are two main objectives of this research: the first is to develop a negotiation modeling
approach to assist in conflict resolution; the second is to develop a comprehensive DSS to
allow practical application of di↵erent modeling methodologies related to GMCR, including
the new negotiation model.
The specific goals of this research and their intended results are outlined as follows:
1. Reverse engineer the pre-existing GMCR to develop a new approach called “Inverse
GMCR”:
• To allow negotiators to understand how a desired resolution can be achieved
and suggest relevant strategies to the DMs.
• To overcome the documented challenges in modeling conflicts in standard GMCR
such as determining preference ranking (Hipel, 2011).
• To require minimal information to model conflicts.
2. Propose new stability definitions for “Inverse GMCR”:
• To permit formal and systematic modeling of negotiation problems.
• To allow the new methodology to be e ciently programmed.
3. Develop a comprehensive DSS with user-friendly advanced features:
• To ease application of the methodology by both professionals and researchers.
• To overcome limitations of previous DSSs.
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• To provide analysts with insightful information using graphs, tables, and nar-
rative results.
• To present interactive post-analysis tools such as equilibrium categorization,
coalition analysis, and status quo analysis.
• To accommodate future advancements of GMCR by having a modular design.
4. Apply the methodology to diverse real-world problems:
• To illustrate the value of “Inverse GMCR” in a variety of application domains.
• To validate and verify the new DSS using documented real-world applications.
1.3 Thesis Organization
The following diagram in Figure 1.1 illustrates the organization of this thesis with key
points of each chapter. Chapters 1 - 4 describe the problem statement that this research
is solving. Chapter 1 discusses the motivation and main objectives of this research. The
existing literature on negotiation, third party intervention, and previous DSS is reviewed
in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 is a review of the existing GMCR methodology while Chap-
ter 4 illustrates the challenges of the existing GMCR methodology through a real world
international conflict.
Chapter 5 provides the solution model, which is the Inverse GMCR approach. In
Chapter 6, the new DSS is described along with two case studies to illustrate its capabilities.
The main contributions with directions for future research are provided in Chapter 7.
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Chapter 2
Background and Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
Conflict resolution is not about eliminating conflicts, but rather accepting them and recog-
nizing formal or informal activities undertaken by the DMs or mediators, in order to limit
and reduce potential violence (Bercovitch and Jackson, 2009). The goal is to achieve an
understanding and agreement to dictate resource allocation and future dealings with the
opponents. Mediation is likely to happen in high intensity and complex conflicts. These
conflicts rarely lead to a resolution without compromise on the part of one or more DMs
involved. Therefore, agreements between DMs likely cover a limited segment of the issues
in dispute and are short-lived (Bercovitch and Gartner, 2006).
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2.2 Negotiation, Third Party Intervention, and Me-
diation
The negotiation process can be defined as “the interaction that occurs between the par-
ties before the outcome” (Thompson, 1990). Among all methods of international conflict
resolution, negotiation is frequently exercised first (Bercovitch and Jackson, 2009). It is
a diplomatic solution that aims to reach an agreement without the use of violence and
through joint decision-making by the DMs in a conflict. It is a tool that requires voluntary
involvement by the DMs and provides an equal platform for the DMs to agree, disagree,
or modify the ultimate resolution of the conflict. This can possibly lead to deadlocks and
stalling in the process without outside intervention (Bercovitch and Jackson, 2009).
In a conflict situation, when other methods have failed at terminating the conflict,
third party intervention is proposed due to the imminent need for resolution (Bercovitch
and Gartner, 2009). Mediation is a form of peaceful third party intervention for joint
decision-making where the mediator has some control over the process and outcome, but
the ultimate power to make decisions rests with the parties directly involved (Moore, 1986).
It entails the disputants seeking assistance or accepting help from a person, group, state,
or an organization to influence their behavior, without the need for physical force or the
need for legal intervention (Bercovitch and Rubin, 1992).
8
2.2.1 Characteristics of Negotiation and Mediation
There are five key characteristics in a negotiation situation as outlined by Thompson
(1990):
1. DMs admit to having conflicting objectives.
2. Communication among DMs can be considered.
3. DMs are willing to reach a compromised resolution.
4. Intermediate solutions and counter proposals can be discussed.
5. The final outcome has to be approved by all DMs involved.
On the other hand, mediation is one of the most important methods used in inter-
national conflict resolution. Third party mediation is usually employed in the following
situation as outlined by Bercovitch and Jackson (2009) :
1. Complex conflicts with no imminent resolution.
2. DMs are unable to resolve the conflict on their own.
3. Social and political costs are mounting.
4. DMs demonstrate willingness for diplomacy and cooperation.
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2.2.2 Negotiation vs. Mediation
Table 2.1 derived from Michael Greig and Diehl (2006) outlines the di↵erences between
negotiation and mediation. Moreover, the authors state that outcomes are more likely to
be achieved by mediation through third party intervention followed by mediation initiated
by the DMs, and finally by negotiation. Whereas diplomacy is more accepted within the
negotiation process as opposed to mediation as depicted in Figure 2.1.
Table 2.1: Comparison between Negotiation versus Mediation
Negotiation) Mediation)Direct)contact)between)DMs) May)not)involve)direct)contact)DMs)have)greater)faith)in)diplomacy) DMs)may)be)pressured)into)a)diplomatic)solution)
Initiated)by)DMs) Initiated)by)DMs)or)third)party)intervention)Greater)commitment)to)resolution) DMs)do)not)have)to)be)fully)invested)in)the)process)with)the)option)to)withdraw)anytime)Higher)domestic)costs)(e.g.)possible)ultimate)failure)of)process,)sign)of)weakness)in)front)of)opponent,)can)be)labeled)as)traitors))
DMs)can)justify)diplomacy)more)easily)with)the)presence)of)a)third)party))
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Figure 2.1: Hierarchy of Outcomes and Acceptance of Diplomacy in Negotiation versus
Di↵erent Mediations
2.2.3 Third Party Roles
A third party can assume di↵erent roles in a conflict. Sakamoto et al. (2005) suggested
three roles a third party can undertake in a conflict. These roles are commonly assumed
when the mediator is not an actual party in the conflict, but is motivated to bring about
a more preferred resolution. The suggested three roles are arbitrator, coordinator, and
donor. The authors explain each role within a conflict. A third party is an arbitrator if it
has the power to restrict or force a DM to accept a certain resolution. If a third party can
alter DMs’ preferences, then it is either a coordinator or a donor. The di↵erence between
the last two roles depends on the time of influence of the third party. A coordinator
influences the DM to change preferences immediately, while a donor works on the long
term (Sakamoto et al., 2005). On the other hand, Rai↵a (1982) classifies third parties as
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facilitators, mediators, arbitrators, or rule manipulators. Another study suggests mediators
can be individuals, regional organizations, states, or international institutions (Bercovitch
and Schneider, 2000; Bercovitch and Gartner, 2006). The latter study surveyed 2,354
international conflicts involving mediation since 1945 in order to analyze them and assess
various general hypotheses. Table 2.2 summarizes their dataset. Some of their hypotheses
will be outlined in Section 2.3.3 of this thesis.
Table 2.2: Dataset Summary (Adopted from Bercovitch and Gartner (2006))
     
          
    
           
        
          
            
           
          
          
         
              
          
       
           
         
          
           
  
Category Frequency
Percent 
(within 
category)
Mediators
Individual 106 4.50
Regional 362 15.38
International 792 33.64
State 1,094 46.47
Strategies
Communications 1,235 52.46
Procedural 434 18.44
Directive 685 29.10
Mediation History
None 137 5.82
Offered Only 129 5.48
Fail 1,182 50.21
Ceasefire 228 9.69
Partial Settlement 579 24.60
Full Settlement 99 4.21
Outcome
Failure 1,310 55.65
Ceasefire 234 9.94
Partial Settlement 657 27.91
Full Settlement 153 6.50
Total 2,354
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2.2.4 Factors Influencing the Outcome of Third Party Interven-
tion
The literature is full of issues and factors a↵ecting third party intervention. For example,
factors a↵ecting the process of intervention is that a mediator can act formally or informally,
be invited to the conflict or not, intervene independently or on behalf of an organization,
have interest in the outcome or in the process of intervention, be inclined toward one party
or the other, and be consultative or directive in the intervention (Lewicki et al., 1992).
Furthermore, mediation history can also have an e↵ect on a new intervention attempt
(Bercovitch and Gartner, 2006). A study by Carnevale and De Dreu (2005) addresses the
element of time. They found that time pressure a↵ects the mediator to be aggressive in
intervening and to use pressuring tactics. Other studies on the e↵ectiveness of third party
intervention suggest factors that influence the success of specific situations. For instance,
if an uninvited third party intervenes, Murray (1983) specifies three important factors for
mediation e ciency: dispute maturity, disputants’ relationship, and intervention timing.
Other issues raised by di↵erent researchers include culture, power asymmetries, conflict
ripeness, number of third parties, third party authority, bias, and consistency (Fisher,
2001).
Another aspect of mediation is strategy. The range of strategies a mediator can un-
dertake is immense. Regan (1996) suggests three basic strategies of intervention within
intrastate conflicts: military, economic, or mixed. Young (1972) discusses four intermedi-
ary functions: informational, tactical, supervisory, and re-conceptualization. In another
study on successful mediation, Bercovitch et al. (1991) outline di↵erent strategies that can
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be adopted by a third party: conciliation-facilitation, procedural, directive, substantive,
and supervisory. The authors explain each of these strategies and assess their impact based
on a range of historical conflicts. While these studies emphasize specific strategies, other
approaches provide a more generic context, referred to as intervention styles. For instance,
Bartunek et al. (1975) organize intervention techniques into two broad styles: content form
and process form. Another wide classification is that of Touval and Zartman, who catego-
rize all intervention approaches as communication, formulation, or manipulation strategies
(Bercovitch and Wells, 1993). Bercovitch and Gartner (2006) suggest that all strategies
can be grouped into communication, procedural, or directive strategies.
2.3 Models and Approaches
Early research in negotiation used primarily artificial environments, lab experiments, sce-
narios, and sociological methods such as interviews and questionnaires (Martinovski, 2010).
Novel trends called for authentic data obtained through face-to-face recordings, e-negotiations,
bargaining, task management etc. This allowed adequate analysis such as discourse anal-
yses, activity-based-communication analysis, and conversation analysis.
On the other hand, various early approaches to mediation included purely scholarly
studies, reflections of mediators, policy implications, and proposals for academics to act
as third-parties in mediations (Bercovitch and Jackson, 2009). Third party intervention
in conflicts has been widely investigated from di↵erent perspectives. Most of the research
lies within the areas of international relations and political sciences. These studies address
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issues regarding mediation including methods of intervention (Fisher, 2001), strategies
for intervention (Prein, 1987), and conditions for successful intervention (Regan, 1996).
Other approaches to conflict resolution previously ignored also include: Track II diplo-
macy (Aggestam, 2002), problem-solving workshops (Kelman, 1992; Burton, 1972), peace-
building and conflict prevention measures (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000; Hartzell et al., 2001).
These new approaches involve many uno cial mediators and can be used ad hoc (Bercov-
itch and Jackson, 2009).
2.3.1 Conflict Types
Conflicts can be classified in a wide variety of ways. In the world of mediation and third
party intervention, the di↵erentiation between intrastate and interstate conflicts is usually
clear. A study by Regan (1996) focuses on success conditions for third party interventions in
intrastate conflicts. Another classification by Bercovitch and Gartner (2006) di↵erentiates
between high intensity conflicts and low intensity conflicts. Another conflict category is
the cause, which can be ethnic, religious, or ideological (Regan, 1996). The size of the
conflict, or the number of parties involved provides another means for classification (Jehn,
1997).
Of the many approaches to study third party intervention, three are prominent in the
literature (Bercovitch and Gartner, 2009) :
1. Individual case studies: these lines of research analyze and explore specific conflicts in
detail. Although this kind of analysis provides significant insights about a particular
conflict, it may lack the ability to be generalized and accommodate other conflicts.
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2. Experimental approaches: these approaches are laboratory experiments where vari-
ables are controlled by researchers in an artificial setting (Rubin, 1980; Carnevale
and De Dreu, 2005)
3. Large scale systematic studies: these studies analyze data representing many conflicts
and use criteria to identify factors and relationships a↵ecting the conflicts and their
outcomes. It gives a more generalized understanding of conflict management.
2.3.2 Negotiation Approaches
Thompson (1990) classifies the theories and approaches of negotiation into these categories:
individual di↵erences, motivations, and cognitive models. Two models that depict the
individual di↵erences approach are the direct-e↵ect models and contingency models. Dual-
Concern model is an example of the motivations approach. Finally, information processing
theory is the basis of the cognitive approach.
Negotiation began to be conducted electronically with the advent of internet as a com-
munication tool (Kilgour and Eden, 2010). This allowed regulation and monitoring of
the negotiation for analysis. Various negotiation models were developed from fields of
engineering, communication research, management science, and psychology. The vari-
ous methods to analyze negotiation processes rely on di↵erent interactions between DMs.
There are quantitative as well as qualitative approaches for providing group negotiation
support (Ackermann and Eden, 2010). The quantitative approaches include GMCR (Fang
et al., 1993), Game Theory (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944), and others that view
negotiation within a game theory framework (Bennett et al., 1997; Bennett, 1980). On the
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other hand, the qualitative approaches seek out “Getting to Yes” (Fisher et al., 1987) and
“Building Agreement” (Fisher and Shapiro, 2007) with emphasis on ‘reaching agreements’
and ‘changing thinking’ instead of mathematically optimum solutions.
2.3.3 Mediation and Third Party Modeling
Many studies in the literature tackle third party intervention in the context of a specific
historical conflict or set of conflicts such as the work by Regan (1996); Bercovitch et al.
(1991); Dixon (1996). For instance, the research by Regan (1996) on success conditions
for third party interventions focuses only on intrastate conflicts and analyzes the conflicts
that occurred during the period between 1944 to 1994 (Table 2.3). The author suggests a
regression model based on the dataset he gathered as illustrated in Fig 2.2. The author
emphasizes three intrastate conflict types: ethnic, religious, and ideological. Moreover,
the regression model took into account other factors a↵ecting the intervention such as the
number of causalities, intervention type, and intervention target.
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Figure 2.2: A snapshot of the regression model by Regan (1996) with the results applied
to the study dataset
Although most third party modeling based on historical conflicts uses regression analysis
(Regan, 1996; Dixon, 1996), game theory based models are also used to formally model
third party intervention based on particular conflicts such as the research by Carment
and James (1996); Hipel et al. (2014). One of the challenges in the application of game
theory based models is the uncertainty of preference, which has been addressed in research
initiatives such as preference uncertainty (Li et al., 2004a) and fuzzy preferences (Bashar
et al., 2012). The “Protracted Conflict Crisis model” was developed to support the notion
that mediation is most likely to occur in crises during intense international events (Brecher
and James, 1988). In addition, Fisher (2001) and Lewicki et al. (1992) discuss di↵erent
conceptual and descriptive models for third party intervention. Lastly, a standard conflict
model of third party intervention is suggested by Siqueira (2003).
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Table 2.3: A dataset segment of the Intrastate Conflicts used in Regan’s study (Table
adopted from Regan (1996))
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A study by Sakamoto et al. (2005) illustrates an approach to incorporate third party
intervention in conflict modeling using GMCR. The research suggests three roles a third
party can undertake (explained in Section 2.2.3 of this thesis) and developed a conflict man-
agement procedure for them. Fig 2.3 below illustrates the authors’ conflict management
approach with the intervention of a third party.
Figure 2.3: Chart developed by Sakamoto et al. (2005) to illustrate conflict management
with a third party
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A comprehensive study by Bercovitch and Gartner (2006) investigates in depth the
success factors of third party intervention. The authors focus on mediators’ identities,
strategies, and mediation history to predict the outcome of mediation. According to the
authors, mediators can be classified according to four categories: individuals, states, re-
gional organizations, and international institutions. After discussing each category, the
authors claim that in low intensity conflicts, state and regional mediators are more likely
to be successful. However, they are less likely to be successful in high intensity conflicts.
International mediators are likely to be e↵ective in high intensity conflicts and individ-
uals are unlikely to be successful in all conflict types. On the other hand, the authors
suggest that mediation strategies include communication-facilitation, procedural, and di-
rective strategies. Similarly, the authors make some hypotheses after explaining each of
the strategies. They claim that directive strategies are most likely to be successful in high
intensity conflicts but not in low intensity conflicts. Procedural strategies are mostly suc-
cessful in low intensity conflicts. Tables 2.4 and 2.5 summarize the research hypotheses in
the study.
Table 2.4: Mediator type and likelihood to be successful
I and Table II are summaries derived from the research 
hypotheses in the study [1].  
TABLE I.  MEDIATOR TYPE AND LIKELIHOOD TO BE SUCCESSFUL 
Conflict 
Type 
Identity 
Individuals States Regional Organizations 
International 
Institutions 
High 
Intesity Unlikely 
Less 
likely Less likely Likely 
Low 
Intensity Unlikely Likely Likely Likely 
 
TABLE II.  MEDIATOR STRATEGY AND LIKELIHOOD TO BE SUCCESSFUL 
Conflict 
Type 
Strategy 
Directive Procedural Communication-Facilitation 
High 
Intesity Likely Unlikely Passive 
Low 
Intensity Unlikely Likely Passive 
 
A useful example to illustrate this approach is a conflict 
happened back in 1975 between Syria and Iraq along the 
Euphrates River. This conflict has been thoroughly studied and 
analyzed using GMCR [16]. The two main decision makers in 
this conflict are Syria and Iraq. Briefly, Syria started filling a 
lake behind a newly built dam along the Euphrates River and 
consequently the flow to Iraq dropped from 920 m3/sec to an 
unacceptable 197 m3/sec. Iraq escalated the situation and Syria 
refused to cooperate. As a result, the conflict developed and 
Syria closed its airspace to all Iraqi airplanes and massed its 
troops in front of the Iraqi border by May 1975 [27]. On the 
other hand, Iraq escalated the situation and sent its army to the 
shared border and threatened to destroy Syria’s dam. Before the 
conflict turns into a full scale war, Saudi Arabia and the Soviet 
Union intervened and war was averted.  Part of the mediation 
undertaken is that Saudi Arabia funded irrigation reform 
projects to reduce unmet demand [28]. 
To analyze this conflict using the predictive approach we 
first predict the intervention success probability. In this 
example we will depend solely on qualitative data for this 
stage. According to [1] this conflict is classified to be of high 
intensity. And since the mediator provides incentives for the 
parties, the strategy is considered to be directive strategy. 
Referring back to Tables I and II we can see clearly that in the 
strategy factor the mediation is likely to be successful. On the 
other hand, the identity of the mediator in this case (the 
mediators, Saudi Arabia and Soviet Union, are considered 
states) is less likely to be successful but not unlikely. 
Combining these results, one can argue that above average 
successfulness can be predicted. Ideally, a regression model is 
to be developed for this specific conflict and a numeric value 
explaining the success rate is to be obtained.  
The second stage of the approach is to analyze the conflict 
using GMCR. The detailed analysis of this specific conflict can 
be referred to in the mentioned paper [16].  The conflict 
decision makers and options are outlined in Table III. 
According to the procedure of GMCR [14] a set of possible 
states is to be generated as in Table IV. The moves between the 
states can be represented using the graph model as in Fig. 1 and 
Fig. 2.  
TABLE III.  DMS AND OPTIONS 
DM Option  Description 
Syria 1. Release 
Water 
Y Syria agrees to halt the filling of 
Thawra Dam and let the Euphrates 
flow into Iraq  
  N Syria continues to fill its dam 
 2. Escalate Y This could be done by cutting 
relations with Iraq, sending troops to 
the shared border, closing the air 
space to Iraqi aircraft, or any 
combination of these actions 
  N Syria does not undertake any of the 
escalating options 
Iraq  3. Attack Y This includes bombing of the dam 
and going to war with Syria 
  N Iraq does not act and accepts the 
situation 
Third 
Party  
4. Act Y This includes mediation and 
reconciliation between the two 
countries and monetary support  
  N Do not intervene 
 
TABLE IV.  SET OF POSSIBLE STATES 
DM       Option 
Syria 1. Release 
Water 
N Y N N Y N N Y N N Y N 
      2. Escalate N N Y N N Y N N Y N N Y 
Iraq 3. Attack N N N Y Y Y N N N Y Y Y 
Third 
Party 
     4. Act N N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Label 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  9 10   11   12  
 
 
Figure 1 Integrated Graph Model of the 1975 conflict without the Third Party. 
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Table 2.5: Mediator strategy and likelihood to be successful
I and Table II are summaries derived from the research 
hypotheses in the study [1].  
TABLE I.  MEDIATOR TYPE AND LIKELIHOOD TO BE SUCCESSFUL 
Conflict 
Type 
Identity 
Individuals States Regional Organizations 
International 
Institutions 
High 
Intesity Unlikely 
Less 
likely Less likely Likely 
Low 
Intensity Unlikely Likely Likely Likely 
 
TABLE II.  MEDIATOR STRATEGY AND LIKELIHOOD TO BE SUCCESSFUL 
Conflict 
Type 
Strategy 
Directive Procedural Communication-Facilitation 
High 
Intesity Likely Unlikely Passive 
Low 
Intensity Unlikely Likely Passive 
 
A useful example to illustrate this approach is a conflict 
happened back in 1975 between Syria and Iraq along the 
Euphrates River. This conflict has been thoroughly studied and 
analyzed using GMCR [16]. The two main decision makers in 
this conflict are Syria and Iraq. Briefly, Syria started filling a 
lake behind a newly built dam along the Euphrates River and 
consequently the flow to Iraq dropped from 920 m3/sec to an 
unacceptable 197 m3/sec. Iraq escalated the situation and Syria 
refused to cooperate. As a result, the conflict developed and 
Syria closed its airspace to all Iraqi airplanes and massed its 
troops in front of the Iraqi border by May 1975 [27]. On the 
other hand, Iraq escalated the situation and sent its army to the 
shared border and threatened to destroy Syria’s dam. Before the 
conflict turns into a full scale war, Saudi Arabia and the Soviet 
Union intervened and war was averted.  Part of the mediation 
undertaken is that Saudi Arabia funded irrigation reform 
projects to reduce unmet demand [28]. 
To analyze this conflict using the predictive approach we 
first predict the intervention success probability. In this 
example we will depend solely on qualitative data for this 
stage. According to [1] this conflict is classified to be of high 
intensity. And since the mediator provides incentives for the 
parties, the strategy is considered to be directive strategy. 
Referring back to Tables I and II we can see clearly that in the 
strategy factor the mediation is likely to be successful. On the 
other hand, the identity of the mediator in this case (the 
mediators, Saudi Arabia and Soviet Union, are considered 
states) is less likely to be successful but not unlikely. 
Combining these results, one can argue that above average 
successfulness can be predicted. Ideally, a regression model is 
to be developed for this specific conflict and a numeric value 
explaining the success rate is to be obtained.  
The second stage of the approach is to analyze the conflict 
using GMCR. The detailed analysis of this specific conflict can 
be referred to in the mentioned paper [16].  The conflict 
decision makers and options are outlined in Table III. 
According to the procedure of GMCR [14] a set of possible 
states is to be generated as in Table IV. The moves between the 
states can be represented using the graph model as in Fig. 1 and 
Fig. 2.  
TABLE III.  DMS AND OPTIONS 
DM Option  Description 
Syria 1. Release 
Water 
Y Syria agrees to halt the filling of 
Thawra Dam and let the Euphrates 
flow into Iraq  
  N Syria continues to fill its dam 
 2. Escalate Y This could be done by cutting 
relations with Iraq, sending troops to 
the shared border, closing the air 
space to Iraqi aircraft, or any 
combination of these actions 
  N Syria does not undertake any of the 
escalating options 
Iraq  3. Attack Y This includes bombing of the dam 
and going to war with Syria 
  N Iraq does not act and accepts the 
situation 
Third 
Party  
4. Act Y This includes mediation and 
reconciliation between the two 
countries and monetary support  
  N Do not intervene 
 
TABLE IV.  SET OF POSSIBLE STATES 
DM       Option 
Syria 1. Release 
Water 
N Y N N Y N N Y N N Y N 
      2. Escalate N N Y N N Y N N Y N N Y 
Iraq 3. Attack N N N Y Y Y N N N Y Y Y 
Third 
Party 
     4. Act N N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Label 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  9 10   11   12  
 
 
Figure 1 Integrated Graph Model of the 1975 conflict without the Third Party. 
2.4 Previous Decision Support Systems for Conflict
Resolution
DSS for group negotiations, referred to as GDSS, have been used for over 30 years for
various reasons such as providing anonymity (Jessup and Tansik, 1991; Valacich et al.,
1992), increasing group productivity (Valacich and Jessup, 1993), visual interactive mod-
eling (Ackermann and Eden, 2001), and enabling collaborative working (Agres et al., 2005;
Briggs et al., 2003). In recent times, there are trends in the collaboration engineering arena
(De Vreede et al., 2003; Vreede and de Bruijn, 1999; Van Herik and Vreede, 2000) to focus
GDSS application in negotiations between DMs to reach a desired resolution (Ackermann
and Eden, 2010). Information systems for negotiation modeling require characterization
of social interactions with its goal of reaching a desired resolution. Previous information
systems neglected the need for third party modeling (Etezadi-Amoli, 2010). The first,
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and best known computer supported GDSS was “Group Systems” (Dennis et al., 1988;
Nunamaker et al., 1991). “Meeting Works” is another GDSS based on a decision analysis
framework (Lewis, 1993). A third GDSS focusing on negotiation is called “Group Explorer”
which is based on the Strategic Options Development and Analysis (SODA) methodology
(Ackermann and Eden, 2001).
In general terms, a DSS is defined as “a computer-based system that aids the process
of decision making” (Finlay, 1994). A DSS has to be user-oriented by allowing the DM to
understand and formalize preferences while being problem-oriented by defining the problem
structure, searching for a resolution, and conducting sensitivity analysis (Kersten and
Lai, 2010). Since the introduction of strategic conflict models, there have been various
attempts at DSS softwares to assist researchers in carrying out conflict analysis. For
example, CONAN (Howard, 1990) and INTERACT (Bennett et al., 1994) are systems
based on Howard’s “metagame analysis” (Howard, 1987) and DecisionMaker (Fraser and
Hipel, 1980, 1989) and SPANNS (Meister and Fraser, 1994) are founded on Fraser and
Hipel’s “conflict analysis” (Fraser and Hipel, 1984). Graph Model for Conflict Analysis
(GMCA or sometimes called GMCR I) (Kilgour et al., 1990) and GMCR II (Hipel et al.,
1999; Peng, 1999) are the only DSS tailored to implement GMCR.
Application of the standard GMCR proved the need for software assistance, as solving
even small models by hand could be cumbersome and inaccurate (Kilgour et al., 2001).
GMCA (or GMCR I) was very useful in assisting researchers to utilize GMCR algorithms,
despite the fact that it lacked graphical user interface (GUI) (Kilgour et al., 1996). GMCA
was written in the C language and had an engine that calculated stability for di↵erent
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solution concepts. However, it could only analyze 100 states for multi-participant conflict
models. In 1999, Peng developed GMCR II, an upgraded version of GMCA, that featured
the first GUI (Peng, 1999). While using the same engine as GMCA, GMCR II’s engine
was based on a logical representation of GMCR, making it less e cient to compute re-
sults. The software encountered issues that sometimes caused it to crash or display error
messages. Although it possessed a user-friendly input system, GMCR II lacked important
features especially in output interpretation such as drawing graphs, narrating results, and
performing status quo analysis. There have been no significant upgrades to this system
although many new concepts and advances have been introduced to GMCR.
2.5 Third Party Intervention in the Literature:
Strengths and Weaknesses
According to the aforementioned literature review, Table 2.6 outlines the main strengths
and drawbacks of the current literature on third party intervention.
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Table 2.6: Strengths and Weaknesses
Strengths Weaknesses 
Methods and strategies for intervention are 
investigated 
Research and studies are fragmented and 
isolated over several disciplines 
Conditions for successful intervention are 
discussed 
There is no consensus on ideal roles or 
strategies for third party intervention  
Qualitative approaches are found within 
the field of political science 
Very few quantitative approaches are 
available 
Many historical conflicts are analyzed 
using regression models 
A generic methodology to model and 
analyze third party intervention is needed 
DSS are available to assist researchers in 
conflict analysis 
Information systems have neglected the 
need for third party modeling !
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2.6 Chapter Summary
This chapter introduces existing literature on negotiation and mediation methodologies as
well as previous DSS to model and analyze conflicts. The di↵erence between negotiation,
third party intervention, and mediation is highlighted. The following are key points of this
chapter:
1. Conflicts over ethnic, religious, or ideological problems have plagued DMs for cen-
turies. The ultimate goal is to achieve peaceful conflict resolution without violence
(Bercovitch and Jackson, 2009).
2. Negotiation and mediation are functionally equivalent. However, negotiation is a
softer process involving more diplomacy as opposed to mediation in general (Michael Greig
and Diehl, 2006).
3. Negotiation between the DMs within a conflict, whether self-initiated or through
outside intervention, allows a formal mediator to have some control in navigating the
course of the conflict (Moore, 1986).
4. Third party intervention constitutes a vital element in conflicts; however, most re-
search on third party intervention is done in relative isolation and research on third
party roles is fragmented due to many factors including discipline (Lewicki et al.,
1992).
5. An external mediator can assume di↵erent roles such as an arbitrator, coordinator,
or a donor (Sakamoto et al., 2005).
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6. The eventual success or failure of a third party intervention depends on various
factors such as the mediator’s impartiality, the DMs’ willingness to compromise in
the conflict, time pressure, and mediation history (Lewicki et al., 1992).
7. The dominant modeling method in the area of mediation and third party intervention
is regression analysis of historical conflicts.
8. There are three basic strategies of third party intervention in intrastate conflicts,
namely: military, economic, and mixed (Regan, 1996) while Bercovitch and Gartner
(2006) class all strategies as communication, procedural, and directive.
9. There are qualitative approaches to negotiation support that focus on ‘reaching agree-
ments’ and ‘changing thinking’, while quantitative approaches include Game Theory
(Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) and GMCR (Fang et al., 1993).
10. Although DSSs have been in use for over 30 years, previous systems did not address
the need for mediation modeling (Jessup and Tansik, 1991; Etezadi-Amoli, 2010).
11. GMCR I and GMCR II are the only DSSs based on GMCR by Fang et al. (1993) but
were last updated in 1999. They lacked robustness, missed important developments
and features, indicating the immediate need for a new comprehensive DSS.
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Chapter 3
The Graph Model for Conflict
Resolution (GMCR)
The game theory mentioned in “Theory of Games and Economics” as first published in
1944 forms the foundation of a number of tools to model conflicts (Von Neumann and
Morgenstern, 2007). These tools allow analysts to e↵ectively determine the best way to
approach conflicts in order to model and analyze them. Major innovative work has since
been done such as the development of “metagames” (Howard, 1971) and “drama theory”
(Howard, 1994a). Metagames introduced a new flexible model within the theoretical ap-
proaches for games allowing practical applications to real-world scenarios (Fraser et al.,
1983). Howard (1971) introduced new solution concepts that determine whether a state is
stable for a DM by labeling states as either rational, general metarational, symmetric meta-
rational, or unstable. These new solution concepts allowed for detailed analyses based on
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more accurate information of human behavior. The new feature of these solution concepts
was the assumption that in a conflict, a DM is only aware of his own relative preference
of a state with respect to another state, that is, whether a state is more preferred, equally
preferred or less preferred compared to another state (Fraser et al., 1983).
In 1984, the metagame analysis was extended by Fraser and Hipel (1979, 1984) by
pioneering sequential stability and simultaneous sanctioning as well as the tableau form
to perform stability calculations. The role of sequential sanctioning is to consider the
possibility that a DM is aware of another DM’s preferences and therefore allow reliable
solutions in which a DM will not harm himself in the process of imposing a sanction. In
1993, Fang, Hipel and Kilgour developed GMCR, which is a graph based model comprising
of sets of arcs that represent potential moves between vertices, which represent di↵erent
conflict states or outcomes.
GMCR is a tool to strategically analyze moves and counter moves by DMs in a con-
flict in order to predict the most likely outcome. GMCR possesses a realistic design for
investigating conflicts. The advantages of using GMCR as a framework include simplicity
and flexibility of its approach while maintaining robustness and practicality in predicting
outcomes (Kilgour et al., 1987; Fang et al., 1989, 1993; Inohara, 2011). Moreover, many
developments have been introduced to the original GMCR framework (Kilgour and Hipel,
2005). For example: coalition analysis (Inohara and Hipel, 2008b,a), preference uncer-
tainty (Li et al., 2004a) , fuzzy preferences (Bashar et al., 2012; Hipel et al., 2011) , and
attitudes (Walker et al., 2008). The GMCR has been developed and expanded since the
mid-1980s (Kilgour and Hipel, 2005) when Kilgour, Hipel, and Fang introduced the idea in
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Kilgour et al. (1987). The most comprehensive representation is introduced by the authors
in Fang et al. (1993).
3.1 Procedure
The basic procedure of GMCR begins with examining a real-world conflict and involves
two main stages: modeling and analysis. In the modeling stage, the user identifies the
conflict parameters which include:
• DMs.
• Options available for each DM.
• Feasible states (i.e. remaining states after removing infeasible states such as mutually
exclusive situations).
• Allowable transitions.
• Relative preferences.
The first step in the modeling stage of GMCR is to determine the DMs who have
an interest and can directly influence the outcome of the conflict. The next step is to
determine the set of feasible states by considering the options, or actions available, to each
DM. A state is defined as a combination of options selected by the DMs. All possible
states, which are composed of all possible combinations of options, may contain infeasible
states. These infeasible states are removed to determine the set of feasible states that will
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actually be considered for analysis. Then, allowable state transitions determine possible
moves for each DM among the feasible states by sealing all other DMs’ options. Finally,
preference relations between feasible states are identified for each DM. These relations can
be derived from the conflict history or through information gathered from DMs.
After identifying the conflict parameters, the user analyzes the conflict from each DM’s
perspective to determine the likely final outcome. This stage includes:
• Determining individual stability (i.e. for each DM).
• Overall equilibria.
• Sensitivity analysis.
The first step in the analysis stage is to investigate the stability of each feasible state
under di↵erent solution concepts for each DM. Four main solution concepts, or stability
definitions, are used within GMCR: Nash stability (R) (Nash et al., 1950; Nash, 1951), gen-
eral metarationality (GMR) (Howard, 1971), symmetric metarationality (SMR) (Howard,
1971), and sequential stability (SEQ) (Fraser and Hipel, 1984). Simultaneous stability
(SIM ) examines the strategic impact of two or more DMs moving together at the same
time from a given state as such combination of moves can result in a new unexpected
outcome (Fraser and Hipel, 1984). These models reflect di↵erent human behavior when
dealing with strategic risks and foresight. For example, Nash stability only looks one move
ahead while SEQ, GMR and SMR look two or three steps ahead. Furthermore, Nash
stability ignores risks posed by other DMs, while SEQ accepts some risks, and SMR and
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GMR are conservative and avoid risks. An equilibrium is defined as a state that is stable
for all DMs under a particular stability definition.
The following diagram in Figure 3.1 illustrates the standard GMCR procedure (The
diagram is adapted from Fang et al. (1993)).
Figure 3.1: The basic procedure of GMCR in a real world conflict (adapted from Fang
et al. (1993))
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3.2 Notation and Definitions of GMCR
The graph model of a real-world conflict is formally defined as a set of DMs, states, directed
graphs to indicate the possible movements between states for each DM, and preference
relations over states by each DM. These parameters can be mathematically represented as
follows:
Definition 3.2.1. Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} represent the set of DMs, for each DM i 2 N ,
the set Oi is i’s options or strategy set and S = {s1, s2, ..., sm} represent the set of feasible
states.
The set of possible states in a conflict is represented by the expression 2↵ where ↵ is
the total number of options in a conflict. Some of the possible states may be infeasible
such as mutually exclusive options, at least one type of options, or dependent options. In
a conflict model, a set of feasible states is defined after removing all infeasible states.
Definition 3.2.2. Let S = {s1, s2, ..., sm} represent the set of feasible states in a conflict.
For each DM i 2 N , a set of directed graphs Di = (S,Ai) can be used to model the conflict.
Ai ✓ S ⇥ S represent the moves controlled by DM i, so that for sa, sb 2 S, (ss, sb) 2 Ai if
and only if DM i can cause the conflict to move (directly) from state sa to state sb. The
feasible states of a conflict are represented by vertices in the graph model. In each graph,
an arc Ai exists between states sa and sb 2 S if DM i can move unilaterally in one step
between the two states. It is called a directed graph because the arc has an orientation
which can be one way (irreversible move) or two ways (reversible move).
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GMCR uses unilateral improvement lists to determine states’ stability by examining
moves and counter moves by DMs. Therefore, it is required to identify all states that are
directly reachable in one step for each DM from a particular state.
Definition 3.2.3. (Reachable List) Let i 2 N and s 2 S. The reachable list for DM i
from state s 2 S is defined as:
Ri(s) = {sa 2 S : (s, sa) 2 Ai}
The move in one step by DM i from a state s to a state in the reachable list {sa 2 S} is
called a unilateral move (UM).
The preference information of DM i is a binary relation { i,⇠i} over S, where sa  i sb
means that DM i prefers sa to sb and sa ⇠i sb means that DM i is indi↵erent between
states sa and sb. The binary relation { i,⇠i} is considered complete.
Definition 3.2.4. (Unilateral Improvement List) Let i 2 N and s 2 S. The unilateral
improvement list for DM i from state s 2 S is defined as:
R+i (s) = {sa 2 Ri(s) : sa  i s}.
The move in one step by DM i from a state s to a state in the unilateral improvement list
{sa 2 S} is called a unilateral improvement (UI).
Definitions 3.2.3 and 3.2.4 are applicable in a two-DM model. However, to calculate the
stability in an n-DM model where n > 2, coalition unilateral improvements are required.
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A coalition is denoted by H ✓ N , where H is any set of DMs and n > 2. The coalition
H is non-empty if |H| > 0, and is non-trivial if |H|   2. A coalition with |H| = 1 is
trivial since it is equivalent to a single DM. Assuming H ✓ N is non-trivial, let RH(s) ✓ S
denote the set of all reachable states from s 2 S through a legal sequence. A sequence of
states is legal if the states are linked by UMs by members of the coalition. A DM in H
may move more than once in a legal sequence, but not twice consecutively. The set of all
last DMs who can to move from state s to s1 in legal sequences is denoted by ⌦H(s, s1).
The reachable list by a coalition is defined as follows:
Definition 3.2.5. (Reachable List for a Coalition) Let s 2 S and H ✓ N , |H|   2.
The subset RH(s) ✓ S is defined inductively as follows:
1. If j 2 H and s1 2 Rj(s), then s1 2 RH(s) and j 2 ⌦H(s, s1);
2. If s1 2 RH(s), j 2 H, s2 2 Rj(s1), and ⌦H(s, s1) 6= {j}, then s2 2 RH(s) and
j 2 ⌦H(s, s2).
The set RH(s) is called the reachable list from s for the coalition H, and any member of
RH(s) is called a unilateral move from s by the coalition H.
Note that, in Definition 3.2.5, the induction stops as soon as no new state (s2) can be
added to RH(s) and |⌦H(s, s1)| cannot be increased for any s1 2 RH(s).
For a general n-DM (n > 2) graph model, a legal sequence of UIs for a coalition can be
defined similarly in order to identify the list of coalition UIs.
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Definition 3.2.6. (Unilateral Improvement by a Coalition) Let s 2 S and H ✓ N ,
|H|   2. A unilateral improvement (UI) from s by the coalition H is the subset R+H(s) ✓ S
defined inductively as follows:
1. If j 2 H and s1 2 R+j (s), then s1 2 R+H(s) and j 2 ⌦+H(s, s1), where ⌦+H(s, s1)
represents the set of all last DMs in legal sequences from s to s1;
2. If s1 2 R+H(s), j 2 H, s2 2 R+j (s1), and ⌦+H(s, s1) 6= {j}, then s2 2 R+H(s) and
j 2 ⌦+H(s, s2).
The induction in Definition 3.2.6 stops as soon as no new state (s2) can be added to R
+
H(s),
and |⌦+H(s, s1)| cannot be increased for any s1 2 R+H(s).
3.3 Stability Definitions and Solution Concepts
The main goal of the graph model for conflict resolution is to predict the stability of each
state for each DM. There are four basic solution concepts according to which a state can
be assessed for stability: Nash stability (sometimes called rationality), sequential stability
(SEQ), general metarationality (GMR), and symmetric metarationality (SMR).
The solution concepts describe how a DM is motivated to make moves and counter
moves. These concepts (or behavior patterns) determine whether a specific state will be
terminal or a DM will be motivated to deviate to another state. Di↵erent DMs may have
di↵erent behavior patterns based on di↵erent factors. These factors include risk, foresight,
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and available information. Behavioral characteristics according to the di↵erent solution
concepts are given in Table 3.1 below.
Definition 3.3.1. (Nash Stability) Let i 2 N and s 2 S. State s is Nash stable for DM
i i↵ R+i (s) =  .
Definition 3.3.2. (Sequential Stability) Let i 2 N and s 2 S. State s 2 S is sequen-
tially stable (SEQ) for DM i i↵ for every s1 2 R+i (s) there exists at least one s2 2 R+N i(s1)
such that s2 -i s.
Definition 3.3.3. (General Metarationality) Let i 2 N and s 2 S. State s 2 S is
general metarational (GMR) for DM i i↵ for every s1 2 R+i (s) there exists an s2 2 RN i(s1)
such that s2 -i s.
Definition 3.3.4. (Symmetric Metarationality) Let i, k 2 N and s 2 S. State s 2 S
is symmetric metarational (SMR) for DM i i↵ for every s1 2 R+i (s) there exists an s2 2
RN i(s1) such that s2 -i s and s3 -i s for all s3 2 Rk(s2).
Table 3.1: Behavioral characteristics describing di↵erent solution concepts
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Definition 3.3.5. (Equilibrium) Let i 2 N and s 2 S. State s 2 S is called equilibrium
(E ) i↵ state s is stable for every DM.
Sometimes the graph model for conflict resolution is referred to as a 3-tuple or triplet
G = hN,S, ( i,⇠i)i2Ni where N = {1, . . . , n} is the list of DMs, S = {1, . . . ,m} is the
set of feasible states, and ( i,⇠i) is the binary relation DM i has on S. Consequently,
Nash(G) = { s 2 S : s is a Nash Equilibrium of G}. More explicitly,
Nash(N,S, ( i,⇠i)i2N) = { s 2 S : s is Nash stable for all i 2 N in hN,S, ( i,⇠i)i2Ni}
and similarly for SEQ, GMR, and SMR.
3.4 Follow-Up Analysis
To take the basic analysis further, a number of follow-up analyses may be undertaken to
test the reliability of the predicted outcomes and whether they are achievable from the
status quo or not.
Since many conflict parameters are subjective, it may be essential to perform sensitivity
analysis in order to determine the robustness of the conflict model. Sensitivity analysis also
points out how di↵erent parameters can influence the stability results. The most common
type of sensitivity analysis is the change of preferences since they are the most di cult
parameters to obtain and determine. Other sensitivity analysis types include:
• Adding or combining DMs.
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• Change of options (adding, removing, or modifying).
• Changing moves reversibility.
• Coalition analysis.
• Modeling misunderstandings (hypergames).
• Examining other patterns of human behavior.
Every real world conflict has a starting point from which the conflict evolves. This point
or state is called status quo (Fang et al., 1993). Depending on the status quo, a potential
equilibrium may or may not be reached. Li et al. (2004b, 2005) developed algorithms and
formal definitions to inspect the attainability of a potential resolution (equilibrium) from
a particular state (status quo).
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3.5 Chapter Summary
This chapter outlines the GMCR procedure, formal definitions, and mathematical repre-
sentations to prepare for the introduction of the Inverse GMCR. Key highlights of this
chapter include:
1. GMCR was developed to understand, model, and analyze conflicts in a practical way
with minimal requirements as existing methods were cumbersome and often failed to
provide useful analyses and insights (Kilgour and Hipel, 2005).
2. GMCR was greatly expanded since the mid-1980s, and di↵erent extensions were
introduced.
3. The reason behind the rapid development of GMCR is that its framework is simple
and its approach is flexible yet robust in predicting outcomes (Fang et al., 1993,
1989).
4. The two stages of GMCR include modeling to identify conflict parameters, and anal-
ysis based on stability definitions to calculate equilibria and the likely final outcome.
5. Nash stability (R), general metarationality (GMR), symmetric metarationality (SMR),
and sequential stability (SEQ) are referred to as the basic solution concepts or stabil-
ity definitions. They are behavior models that determines whether a specific state is
terminal across all DMs, or whether a DM will be motivated to deviate to a di↵erent
state, usually by a unilateral improvement (UI).
40
6. Basic GMCR analysis is usually supplemented with follow-up analyses such as sen-
sitivity analysis to validate the robustness of the conflict model.
Chapter 4 provides a comprehensive analysis using GMCR for a real-world water conflict
with an introduction of third party intervention.
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Chapter 4
Strategic Investigations of Water
Conflicts in the Middle East
The arid nature of the Middle East environment causes continuously escalating conflicts
among the countries of the region. Conflicts arise as water resources dwindle due to in-
creased industrial and agricultural projects and population growth. The main renewable
sources of freshwater in the region are rivers. Like all water resources, they are replen-
ished by their hydrological cycle, with renewal rates varying from days to centuries. The
rate of renewal for Middle Eastern rivers is decreasing due to population growth and the
increasingly arid conditions of the region. At 2,700 km, the Euphrates is the longest and
arguably most important river in the Middle East (Southwest Asia) (Kolars and Mitchell,
1991). The Euphrates originates in eastern Anatolia in Turkey and flows through Syria
and finally Iraq, where it joins the Tigris River. Conflicts regarding the river became se-
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rious during the 1960s, when Turkey began building dams on the Euphrates to generate
electricity and increase the availability of irrigation water in Southeast Turkey (Akanda
et al., 2007). As a result of external mediation, war was narrowly avoided twice, in 1975
and 1998 (Akanda et al., 2007).
Water conflicts have been widely investigated during the last decade (Dinar, 2004) and
di↵erent approaches have been used to model them (Madani, 2010). For instance, the
Waiahole Water Project conflict, in the American state of Hawaii, has been modeled and
analyzed using GMCR (Gopalakrishnan et al., 2005), and a status quo analysis of the
Flathead River conflict involving the United States and Canada was examined using the
same methodology (Li et al., 2004c). Other modeling approaches used to study water con-
flicts include Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) (Wolf, 2000), Shared Vision Modeling
(Lund and Palmer, 1997), and Adjusted Winner (AW) mechanism (Massoud, 2000).
The aim of this chapter is to examine in depth the main conflicts that have occurred in
the past along the Euphrates and to model them using the GMCR methodology (Kilgour
et al., 1987; Fang et al., 1993) as implemented by the decision support system, GMCR
II (Hipel et al., 1997; Fang et al., 2003a,b). Time periods of interest for this analysis
are 1975, 1990, and 1998, when the conflict escalated to the near outbreak of a full scale
war. Accordingly, the historical background underlying the disputes at these three points
in time are described in the next section. Subsequently, modeling and stability analyses
are carried out for these three conflicts, followed by a summary of strategic insights that
are garnered. The contents of this chapter are based on a published paper which was
originally presented as a keynote address at the International Meeting on Group Decision
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and Negotiation held in Recife, Brazil, from May 20th to 24th, 2012 (Hipel et al., 2014).
4.1 Background
As explained in the next three subsections, the interconnected conflicts of 1975, 1990, and
1998 took place dynamically over time. Therefore, systematically investigating these dis-
putes together enhances the appropriateness of the analyses and furnishes more meaningful
insights.
4.1.1 The conflict in 1975
In 1966, Turkey started the construction of the Keban Dam, which is a hydroelectric dam
on the Euphrates River (Fig 4.1). After the construction was finished in 1974, Turkey
started the filling of the Keban Reservoir. During the flooding, Turkey maintained a 450
m3/s discharge of the Euphrates to the two downstream countries consisting of Syria and
Iraq. This rate was agreed upon by both countries through the United States Agency
for International Development (USAID), which was financing the project (Inan, 2000).
However, Syria also started filling the lake behind its newly constructed Thawra Dam.
Simultaneously, the area was hit by a significant drought (Kalpakian, 2004). As a result,
the flow of the Euphrates River entering Iraq was reduced to a trickle. Iraq accused Syria
of this reduction and of endangering the lives of three million Iraqi farmers dependent on
river irrigation water (Morris, 1997). Iraq complained that the flow had dropped from
the normal 920 m3/sec to an unacceptable 197 m3/sec (Priscoli and Wolf, 2009). Iraq
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requested an intervention by the Arab League; however, Syria argued that it was receiving
less water from Turkey as well and refused to cooperate. As the tension increased, Syria
closed its airspace to all Iraqi aircraft, suspended Syrian flights to Baghdad, and transferred
troops from the Israeli border to the Iraqi frontier by May 1975 (Morris, 1997). Iraq also
sent its troops to the shared border and threatened to bomb Syria’s dam.
Before the conflict could escalate any further, Saudi Arabia and the Soviet Union in-
tervened - only mediation on the part of Saudi Arabia was able to alleviate the situation
(Priscoli and Wolf, 2009). On June 3, 1975, an agreement between Iraq and Syria, with
the mediation of Saudi Arabia, averted the impending war. The agreement stipulated that
Syria is to release extra amounts of water to Iraq (Akanda et al., 2007): specifically, 58% of
what Syria receives from the Euphrates is to be released to Iraq (Priscoli and Wolf, 2009).
In addition to resolving the conflict, Saudi Arabia contributed to a basin fund that would
finance irrigation reform and other methods to reduce unmet demands (Akanda et al.,
2007).
4.1.2 The Conflict in 1990
In 1977, Turkey announced plans for the largest water resources project in South-Eastern
Anatolia, referred to as “Gu¨neydogu Anadolu Projesi”, commonly known as the “GAP
Project”, which includes 22 dams and 19 hydropower installations on the Euphrates-Tigris
(Frenken et al., 2009). The incentive for this project, apart from the steadily increased
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Figure 4.1: The Euphrates River along with the dams constructed on it (The New York
Times, 2009)
water demand, was to promote Turkey’s internal stability. Turkey has been continually
preoccupied with the rebellion movement of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), which is
struggling to create a Kurdish state in South Eastern Turkey (Gu¨ner, 1998). The con-
struction of the GAP project scattered the Kurdish rebels and the PKK denounced the
GAP project as harmful to Kurds and their villages. GAP irrigation projects transformed
the geography of the area and obstructed the free movement of the PKK. The PKK had
targeted the GAP project with sabotage and kidnapping of engineers in order to stop
the development. Aside from weakening the PKK movement, the GAP project also pro-
vided extra jobs for resident Kurds, thereby promoting internal stability. It also helped in
stemming the flow of immigrants from this region to the already over-crowded cities.
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On the other hand, both Syria and Iraq demonstrated their distrust and rejection of
the GAP project. When Turkey requested funding from the World Bank for a second
dam after the Keban Dam, Syria and Iraq raised many objections to urge the World Bank
to withhold the funding, although the Bank and Turkey concluded that the downstream
requirements could be satisfied (Akanda et al., 2007). During the conflict between Turkey
and PKK, Syria supported the PKK by granting their leader refugee status and provided
him with shelter. Moreover, Syria allowed PKK to have military bases in the Beqaa Valley,
a region in eastern Lebanon under Syria’s control (Gu¨ner, 1998). Syrian support of the
PKK was potentially intended for the reduction, or at least the interruption, of the GAP
project (Gu¨ner, 1998). In 1987, Turkey guaranteed a minimum water flow of 500 m3/s and
Syria, in return, promised to cooperate in security matters. A few months later, Turkey
complained about terrorist activities and accused Syria of supporting them (Gu¨ner, 1998).
Turkey allegedly hinted at a cut in the flow of Euphrates water to Syria over Syrian support
for Kurdish terrorists (Starr, 1991). In January 1990, Turkey completely stopped the flow
of the Euphrates. The o cial justification for the interruption was to fill the lake behind
the Ataturk Dam and the interruption was intended to be only for one month (Darwish,
1994). Behind the scenes, this interruption was an indirect threat to Syria for its continued
support of the PKK. Turkey did not care about Iraq’s reaction as Syria and Iraq were bitter
enemies; however, Turkey’s actions united both Iraq and Syria against it. Once Turkey
halted the flow of the Euphrates, both countries, Syria and Iraq, boycotted companies
involved in the GAP project. Furthermore, military leaders from both nations drew up
plans for armed retaliation against Turkey (Darwish, 1994). After three weeks, water was
released in the Euphrates River, even though the interruption was intended to last a whole
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month.
4.1.3 The Conflict in 1998
After the joint coalition between Syria and Iraq in 1990, Turkey decided not to use the
Euphrates as a weapon in order to avoid Iraq’s intervention. However, Syria’s continuous
support for the PKK was a↵ecting Turkey’s stability and depleting its resources. Despite
bilateral security agreements between Syria and Turkey in 1992 and 1993, Turkey continued
to accuse Syria of supporting the PKK, while Syria insisted that it forced the PKK to move
its bases from Syrian territory in conformity with the bilateral agreements between itself
and Turkey (Gu¨ner, 1998). In 1993, the Turkish Prime Minister declared that if Syria did
not ban PKK from its country, there could be no solution to the water problem. The issue
was raised again in the trilateral summit of 1994 between the Foreign Ministers of Turkey,
Syria, and Iraq with no improvements. Moreover, in 1995, Turkey organized military
operations in northern Iraq against PKK members who fled to Syria, thus confirming
Turkish suspicions. Finally, in 1998, Turkey charged Syria with support of the PKK and
harboring its leader, perhaps providing refuge to the leader in Damascus. Turkey escalated
the situation and threatened to invade Syria. Egypt intervened and the Egyptian President,
Hosni Mubarak, secured Syria’s pledge to stop supporting the PKK (Akanda et al., 2007).
On account of the intervention of Egypt and in order to avert an invasion by Turkey,
the Syrian government agreed to ban PKK from Syria by signing the Adana Agreement
on October 20, 1998 (Priscoli and Wolf, 2009). Finally, Table 4.1 provides the historical
evolution of the most notable events related to the Euphrates conflicts.
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Table 4.1: Notable events related to conflicts along the Euphrates River
Dates Events 
Early 1970s Rebellious Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) was formed. Syria 
supported this party.  
Late 1974 The filling of Keban and Thawra dams started. 
Early 1975 Iraq complained about the flows in the Euphrates dropping from 
the normal 920 m3/sec to an “intolerable” 197 m3/sec. Iraq 
requested that the Arab League intervene. However, Syria said it 
was receiving less than average flow and dropped out of the Arab 
League. Both countries amassed their troops on the shared borders 
and the situation escalated. 
June 3, 1975 Intervention and mediation efforts by Saudi Arabia are at last 
successful and war was averted. Agreement details were not 
announced. 
1977 Turkey announced plans for the "GAP Project", which includes 22 
dams and 19 hydropower installations on the Euphrates-Tigris 
Rivers. 
1987 Turkey guaranteed a minimum water flow of 500 m3/s and Syria, 
in return, promised to cooperate in security matters. A few months 
later, Turkey complained about terrorist activities and accused 
Syria of supporting them. 
January, 
1990 
The filling of the Ataturk Dam by Turkey started, shutting off 
completely the flow to the Euphrates River. Even though the 
interruption was intended to be for only one month, Syria and Iraq 
boycotted companies involved in the GAP project. Moreover, 
military leaders from both nations drew up plans for armed 
retaliation against Turkey. After three weeks, Turkey released 
water to the Euphrates River. 
1992  1994 Bilateral security agreements between Syria and Turkey were 
discussed, with little success. Turkey continued to accuse Syria of 
supporting the PKK. In 1993, the Turkish Prime Minister declared 
that if Syria did not ban PKK from its country, there could be no 
solution to the water problem. 
1995 Turkey organized military operations in northern Iraq against 
PKK members who fled to Syria, thus confirming Turkish 
suspicions. 
August, 
1998 
Turkey threatened full military action and invasion against Syria 
for continuing to support PKK rebels. 
October, 
1998 
With the mediation of Egypt, the Adana Agreement, obligating 
the Syrian government to ban PKK, was signed by Turkey and 
Syria. 
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4.2 Conflict Analysis of the 1975 Dispute
The DMs and options for the 1975 conflict are given in Table 4.2. Notice that Syria has an
option regarding the release of the water plus an option of escalating the situation. Iraq
has the single option of attacking Syria. Since both Saudi Arabia and the Soviet Union
have similar preferences and reasons for getting involved, they are considered as a single
DM labeled as “Third Party”. The Third Party has a single option of acting or not. Table
4.2 describes the options for each DM. Each option is labeled with a number and can be
either taken (Y for yes) or not (N for no). For example, option 3, which is entitled Attack,
is the situation in which Iraq can use military action to force Syria to release water into the
Euphrates. Undertaking this option, as indicated by Y for yes, means using force, while
not taking this option, N for no, indicates accepting the situation and allowing Syria to fill
the Thawra Dam without escalation.
Table 4.2: DMs, options and descriptions for the 1975 conflictTable 1. DMs, options an  descript ons for the 1975 conflict. 
DM Option Choice Description 
Syria 1.Release 
Water 
Y Syria agrees to halt the filling of Thawra Dam and let 
the Euphrates flow into Iraq  
 N Syria continues to fill its dam 
2.Escalate Y This could be done by cutting relations with Iraq, 
sending troops to the shared border, closing the air 
space to Iraqi aircraft, or any combination of these 
actions 
  N Syria does not undertake any of the escalating options 
Iraq 3.Attack Y This includes bombing of the dam and going to war 
with Syria 
  N Iraq does not act and accepts the situation 
Third 
Party 
4.Act Y This includes mediation and reconciliation between 
the two countries and monetary support  
  N Do not intervene 
 
  
To emphasize the e↵ect of the third party, this conflict will be analyzed without and
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with the intervention of the third party. The sets of possible states are given in Tables
4.3 and 4.4, respectively. Notice that there is one infeasible situation in which Syria
both releases the water and escalates the situation at the same time (mutually exclusive
options). Taking this into account results in the removal of two states in the model without
the intervention of the third party and the removal of four states in the model with the
participation of the third party.
Table 4.3: DMs, options and states for the 1975 conflict without the third partyTable 2. DMs, options and states f  the 1975 conflict without the Third Party. 
DM Option  States 
Syria 1.Release 
Water 
N Y N N Y N 
 2.Escalate N N Y N N Y 
Iraq 3.Attack N N N Y Y Y 
Label  1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
  
Table 4.4: DMs, options and states for the 1975 conflict with the third partyTable 3. DMs, optio s and states for the 1975 confli t with the Third Party. 
DM Option States 
Syria 1.Release 
Water 
N Y N N Y N N Y N N Y N 
 2.Escalate N N Y N N Y N N Y N N Y 
Iraq 3.Attack N N N Y Y Y N N N Y Y Y 
Third Party 4.Act N N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Label  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
 
  
Figures 4.2 and 4.3 show the integrated Graph Models of the conflict both without and
with the participation of the third party, respectively. The numbers in the nodes refer to
the state numbers as indicated in Tables 4.3 and 4.4. The lines with arrows between the
nodes are moves that can be carried out by the indicated DM in one step.
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Figure 4.2: Integrated Graph Model of the 1975 conflict without the third party
Figure 4.3: Integrated Graph Model of the 1975 conflict with the third party
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Table 4.5 presents the preference prioritization information for each DM in the 1975
conflict without the participation of the third party, from most important at the top to
least important at the bottom for each DM. The statements presented herein are a sample
of how the ranking of states is constructed. This information is used to order the states
from most to least preferred by the DM. Assuming transitivity for the preferences, Table
4.6 presents the ranking of states from most to least preferred for both Syria and Iraq using
option prioritization (Hipel et al., 1997; Fang et al., 2003a,b). For example, State 1, which
is the status quo, is the best state to be in for Syria. State 5, in which Syria releases the
Euphrates and Iraq attacks at the same time, is considered the worst possible state for
Syria.
Table 4.5: Preference prioritization information for the 1975 conflict without the third
party Table 4. Preference prioritization information for the 1975 conflict without the Third Party. 
DM P# Preference Information 
(From most to least important) Further Explanation 
Syria 1 Remain at the status quo Syria continues filling its dam and Iraq 
accepts the situation without any escalation or 
intervention 
 2 Escalate the situation if Iraq 
decides to attack 
Syria next prefers going to war with Iraq if it 
is attacked, which is more preferred than 
releasing water 
Iraq 1 Syria releases more flow of 
the Euphrates River 
Iraq most prefers the situation in which Syria 
stops filling its dam without any escalation 
 2 Execute an attack if Syria 
does not release more water 
Iraq’s interest in water far outweighs the 
consequence of going to war  
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Table 4.6: Ranking of states for the DMs in the 1975 conflict without the third partyTable 5. Ranking of states for the D  in the 1975 confli t without the T ird Party. 
DM  States 
Syria 1 3 6 2 4 5 
       
Iraq 2 4 6 1 5 3 
 Most 
Preferred 
 Least 
Preferred 
 
  
The third party could be viewed as an actual DM if it has its own options and prefer-
ences. However, if the party is not an actual stakeholder in the conflict but is motivated
to bring about a more preferred equilibrium, then it can be categorized as Arbitrator,
Coordinator, or Donor (Sakamoto et al., 2005). If the party has the influence to change
other DMs’ preferences or options, then the party is called a Donor. On the other hand,
if the party has the power to exclude some states, then it is considered to be an Arbitra-
tor. In this conflict, the third party, Saudi Arabia, is clearly a Donor as it contributed
to financing the basin development and both DMs, Syria and Iraq, want to please Saudi
Arabia. Therefore, DMs’ preferences, especially on the part of Syria, are changed. Ta-
ble 4.7 presents the preference prioritization information for each DM in the 1975 conflict
with the participation of the third party from most to least preferred. Table 4.8 gives the
preference rankings for Syria, Iraq, and the third party from most to least preferred.
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Table 4.7: Preference prioritization information for the 1975 conflict with the third partyTabl  6. Preference prioritizatio  infor tion for the 1975 conflict with the Third Party. 
DM P# Preference Information 
(From most to least 
important) 
Explanation 
Syria 1 Remain at the status quo Syria continues filling its dam and Iraq 
accepts the situation without any 
escalation or intervention 
 2 Release the flow of the 
Euphrates if and only if 
Iraq does not attack and 
with the mediation of a 
third party 
This is the new preference information 
after the intervention of the Third Party 
 3 Escalate the situation if 
Iraq decides to attack 
Syria’s least preferred situation is to go to 
war with Iraq 
    
Iraq 1 Syria releases the flow of 
the Euphrates 
Iraq’s most preferred situation is that Syria 
stops the filling of its dam without any 
escalation and with or without an 
intervention 
 2 Strike an attack if Syria 
does not release more 
water 
Iraq’s interest in water far outweighs the 
consequence of going to war  
    
Third 
Party 
1 Acts and influences Syria 
to release the flow of the 
Euphrates 
The mediator’s interest is to promote 
peace in the region and reduce harm for 
everyone 
 
  
Table 4.8: Ranking of states for the DMs in the 1975 conflict with the third partyTable 7. Ranking of tates for the s in the 1975 conflict with the Third Party. 
DM States 
Syria 1 3 8 9 2 7 12 6 10 4 11 5 
             
Iraq 8 2 6 12 4 10 7 5 11 1 9 3 
 
Third 
Party 
8 2 1 7 9 3 4 10 6 12 5 11 
 Most 
Preferred 
      Least 
Preferred  
 
  
The objective of the analysis is to determine the equilibrium states, which are the
states from which no DM is motivated to move and, therefore, the conflict will probably
end at that particular state. To determine the equilibrium states we use stability definitions
(or solution concepts), which describe human behavior and patterns based on moves and
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counter moves. Equilibria are states that are stable for all DMs. After inputting the
foregoing information into GMCR II, equilibrium results are obtained for both Syria and
Iraq without the third party (Table 4.9) and with the third party (Table 4.10). In Tables
4.9 and 4.10, the left column gives the di↵erent stability definitions while the remaining
columns present the stability calculation results for each solution concept corresponding
to the state. Nash and Sequential Stability (SEQ) are considered the strongest stability
definitions. General Metarationality (GMR) and Symmetric Metarationality (SMR) are
not considered as strong stability definitions since DMs are permitted to harm themselves
during the process of sanctioning. Fang et al. (1989) discuss the relationships among the
di↵erent solution concepts.
Table 4.9: Equilibrium results for the 1975 conflict without the third partyTable 8. Equilibrium results for t e 1975 conflict without the Third Party. 
Solution 
Concepts States 1 2 3 4 5 6 
R (Nash)       9 
GMR  9     9 
SMR  9     9 
SEQ       9 
 
  
Table 4.10: Equilibrium results for the 1975 conflict with the third partyTable 9. Equilibrium results r the 1975 conflict with the Third Party. 
Solution 
Concepts States 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
 
             
R (Nash)       9  9     
GMR   9    9 9 9    9 
SMR   9    9 9 9    9 
SEQ       9  9     
 
  
It is clear from the aforementioned analysis that when the third party does not par-
ticipate (Table 4.9), the strongest equilibrium is state 6 which means that both Syria and
Iraq go to war. That is what nearly happened as both countries amassed their troops on
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their shared border. The status quo, State 1, is a very weak equilibrium and the unilateral
improvement by Iraq will most likely be taken; that is, Iraq will move to state 4 in which
it will attack. In contrast, with the intervention of the third party, a new equilibrium is
introduced: State 8 in which Syria releases water and no escalation or attack from Iraq
occurs. Referring to the ranking of states in Tables 4.6 and 4.8 as well as the integrated
graphs in Figures 4.2 and 4.3, one can easily view the unilateral moves and improvements
for each DM. A unilateral move is any possible move controlled by that particular DM,
whereas a unilateral improvement necessitates that this move is also a movement to a more
preferred state. The analysis of the conflict demonstrates how each DM’s preferences may
have an impact on the overall conflict. Table 4.11 provides the actual historical evolution
of the conflict when moving from the status quo on the left via several intermediate states
to the final equilibrium on the right. One can clearly see how both Syria and Iraq almost
went to war until the third party intervened. It is clear that the actual historical evolution
of the conflict is consistent with the earlier analysis.
Table 4.11: Historical evolution of the 1975 conflictTable 10. Historical olution of the 1975 conflict. 
DM Option Status 
Quo 
Intermediary 
states 
 Equilibrium 
Syria Release 
Water 
N  N  N  N   Y 
 Escalate N  N  Y  Y   N 
Iraq Attack N  Y  Y  Y   N 
Third Party Act N  N  N  Y   Y 
Label  1  4  6  12   8 
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4.3 Strategic Study of the 1990 Conflict
4.3.1 Modeling and analysis
The DMs and options for the 1990 conflict are given in Table 4.12. Turkey has two options:
escalate the dispute with Syria and/or decrease the flow of the Euphrates. Syria possesses
the two options of stopping its support for the PKK or escalating the situation. Iraq
controls the single option of escalating the situation against Turkey.
Table 4.12: DMs, options and description for the 1990 conflict
DM Option Choice Description 
Turkey (T) Escalate Y This includes an attack on Syria, massing 
the troops on the shared border with Syria 
  N Do not escalate 
 Euphrates 
Cutoff/ 
Reduction 
Y This includes stopping or reducing the 
flow of the Euphrates to Syria and further 
to Iraq 
 N Turkey will allow the river to flow 
Syria (S) Stop PKK 
Support 
Y This includes banning of the PKK in Syria 
and the extradition of PKK leader to 
Turkey 
  N Syria continues to support PKK rebels 
 Escalate Y This includes attacks on Turkey and its 
development projects 
  N Not escalating the situation 
Iraq (I) Escalate Y Iraq will join Syria against Turkey 
  N Iraq will accept the situation and do 
nothing 
 
  
The set of possible feasible states is given in Table 4.13. Notice that the number of
mathematically possible states equals 25 = 32 since there are 5 options each of which can
be taken or not. However, Syria cannot both ban PKK and escalate at the same time
(mutually exclusive options) and there is no point for Iraq to escalate if Turkey does not
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cut the water and Syria does not escalate. Removing the foregoing infeasible situations
leads to a total of 20 feasible states or scenarios.
Table 4.13: DMs, options and states for the 1990 conflict
DM Option 
T Escalate N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y 
 Cut Euphrates N N Y Y N N Y Y N N Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y 
S Ban PKK N N N N Y Y Y Y N N N N N N Y Y N N N N 
 Escalate  N N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y N N N N Y Y Y Y 
I Escalate N N N N N N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Label 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10   11   12   13   14   15  16   17   18   19  20 
 
  
This conflict is now analyzed using a regular analysis and an in-depth coalition analysis
based on the procedure described by Kilgour et al. (2001) and Inohara and Hipel (2008b,a).
Figure 4.4 illustrates the possible moves by Turkey. Figure 4.5 shows the Integrated Graph
Model of the conflict and possible moves by each of Syria and Iraq unilaterally. Figure
4.6 displays the Coalition Graph Model of the conflict for both DMs, Syria and Iraq.
Coalition improvements are denoted in this graph by a filled-in circle while coalition moves
are denoted by a normal arrow. For example, from state 18 (top right corner) in Figure
4.6, there is a coalition move to states 2 and 10. However, the coalition move to state 10
is a coalition improvement by both Syria and Iraq.
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Figure 4.4: Graph Model of the 1990 conflict for movements by Turkey
Figure 4.5: Integrated Graph Model of the 1990 conflict for both Syria and Iraq
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Figure 4.6: Coalition Graph Model of the 1990 conflict for a coalition of Syria and Iraq
Table 4.14 presents the preference prioritization information for each DM of the 1990
conflict without the participation of the third party from most to least important. Table
4.15 presents the ranking of states for all DMs in the conflict from most to least preferred.
Equally preferred states are denoted by a bar above them. Table 4.16 displays the equilibria
results for each of the states after inputting the foregoing information into GMCR II.
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Table 4.14: Preference prioritization information for 1990 conflict
DM P# Preference Information 
(From most to least important) Explanation 
T 1 Syria stops its support for PKK, and 
reduce the flow of the Euphrates to 
continue its development projects 
 
 2 Release the flow of the Euphrates if 
and only if Syria stops its support for 
PKK 
Turkey does not want to escalate 
the situation with Syria if the 
latter banned the PKK 
 3 Stop the flow of the Euphrates and 
escalate the situation against Syria if 
the latter continues to support PKK 
and harbor its leader 
Turkey’s least preferred situation 
is to go to war. The even worse 
situation is if both Syria and Iraq 
escalate at the same time 
S 1 Syria continues to support the PKK 
and Turkey allows the Euphrates to 
flow 
 
 2 Both Syria and Iraq escalate if Turkey 
stops the flow or attacks 
 
 3 Stop supporting PKK if and only if 
Turkey allows the Euphrates to flow 
and Iraq does not join in escalating 
 
I 1 Turkey allows the Euphrates to flow  
 2 Escalate if Turkey stops the flow  
 
 
  
Table 4.15: Preference vector for DMs in the 1990 conflict
DM States 
                     
T 7 8 5 6 3 4 1 2 11 12 15 9 10 16 13 14 17 19 20 18 
S 1 9 17 5 19 20 10 18 2 3 11 13 4 14 12 6 15 16 8 7 
I 1 2 6 5 10 9 19 20 15 16 14 13 18 17 4 7 8 11 12 3 
 Most 
Preferred          
Least 
Preferred 
 
 
  
Table 4.16: Equilibria results for the 1990 conflict
Solution 
Concepts 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
R (Nash)                     
GMR !  !    !     !  !    !  !    !     
SMR !  !    !     !  !            
SEQ !     !     !     !  !    !     
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4.3.2 In-depth coalition analysis
In this subsection, a detailed coalition analysis is undertaken. The procedure for carrying
out this analysis is adapted from Kilgour et al. (2001) and Inohara and Hipel (2008b,a).
The main steps of the procedure are now outlined briefly, while the detailed procedure
can be found in the referenced articles. The first step is to construct the reachable lists
RH(s) of all possible coalitions. This is illustrated in Table 4.17. For simplicity and to save
space, Turkey, Syria, and Iraq are abbreviated as T, S, and I, respectively. Similarly, the
coalition between Turkey and Syria is abbreviated as TS, and so on. Next, one constructs
the coalition improvement lists, denoted by R(++)H (s), of possible coalitions. Table 4.18
provides the results of this step.
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}
{1
3,1
4,1
5,1
6,1
8,1
9,2
0}
{9
,10
,11
,12
,18
,19
,20
}
{1
,5,
9}
{1
,2,
3,4
,5,
6,7
,8,
9,1
0,1
1,1
2,1
3,1
4,1
5,1
6,1
7,1
9,2
0}
18
{1
7,1
9,2
0}
∅
{1
0}
{1
3,1
4,1
5,1
6,1
7,1
9,2
0}
{9
,10
,11
,12
,17
,19
,20
}
{2
,6,
10
}
{1
,2,
3,4
,5,
6,7
,8,
9,1
0,1
1,1
2,1
3,1
4,1
5,1
6,1
7,1
9,2
0}
19
{1
7,1
8,2
0}
{1
3,1
5}
{1
1}
{1
3,1
4,1
5,1
6,1
7,1
8,2
0}
{9
,10
,11
,12
,17
,18
,20
}
{3
,7,
11
,13
,15
}
{1
,2,
3,4
,5,
6,7
,8,
9,1
0,1
1,1
2,1
3,1
4,1
5,1
6,1
7,1
8,2
0}
20
{1
7,1
8,1
9}
{1
4,1
6}
{1
2}
{1
3,1
4,1
5,1
6,1
7,1
8,1
9}
{9
,10
,11
,12
,17
,18
,19
}
{4
,8,
12
,14
,16
}
{1
,2,
3,4
,5,
6,7
,8,
9,1
0,1
1,1
2,1
3,1
4,1
5,1
6,1
7,1
8,1
9}
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Table 4.18: Coalition improvement lists R(++)H (s) for the 1990 conflict
s/H T S I TS TI SI TSI
1 {3,4} ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅
2 {1,3,4} {10} ∅ {1,5} ∅ ∅ ∅
3 ∅ ∅ {13} {5} ∅ {19} {5}
4 {3} ∅ {14} {3,5} ∅ {20} {5}
5 {7,8} {1,9} ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅
6 {5,7,8} {2,10} ∅ {5} ∅ ∅ ∅
7 ∅ {3,11} {15} ∅ ∅ {13,15,19} ∅
8 {7} {4,12} {16} ∅ ∅ {14,16,20} ∅
9 {11,12} {1} ∅ {1} ∅ ∅ ∅
10 {9,11,12} ∅ ∅ {1,5,9} ∅ ∅ ∅
11 ∅ {3} {19} {1,2,3,5} ∅ {19} {1,2,5}
12 11 ∅ {20} {1,2,3,5} ∅ {20} {1,2,5}
13 ∅ {19} ∅ ∅ {1,2} {19} {1,2,5,9,10}
14 {13} {20} ∅ ∅ {1,2} {20} {1,2,5,1,0}
15 ∅ {13,19} ∅ ∅ {6} {19} {1,2,5,6}
16 {15} {14,20} ∅ {15} {5,6} {20} {1,2,5,6,9,10}
17 ∅ ∅ {9} ∅ {9,10} {1,9} {1,9}
18 {17,19,20} ∅ {10} {17,19,20} {9,10,19 20} {10} {159,10,1920}
19 {17} ∅ ∅ {17} {9,10} ∅ {1,5,9}
20 {17,19} ∅ ∅ {17,19} {9,10,19} ∅ {15,919}
The third step is to construct the stability tableau. Table 4.19 illustrates the con-
struction of the table. The fourth step is to calculate the stability of each state for each
DM according to the solution concepts with respect to the various coalitions. Notice that
improvements written alone without squiggly parentheses (i.e.{ }) indicate unilateral im-
provements by that DM. Improvements written to the left of squiggly parentheses mean
that these improvements are carried out with the coalition given within the squiggly paren-
theses. For example, from state 9, Turkey has a unilateral improvement to states 11 and
12. Turkey also has a coalition improvement from state 9 to 1 if it formed a coalition with
Syria in this case and so on.
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Finally, to determine the coalition equilibrium according to a specific solution concept,
the state under consideration should be stable for all of the DMs. In Table 4.19 the
conflict is examined according to both CNash (i.e. Coalition Nash Stability) and CSEQ
(i.e. Coalition Sequential Stability). The coalition stability is a generalization of the
individual stability. Other solution concepts can be assessed as well. However, as this
conflict is fairly large and contains 20 states, the analysis is limited to these two solution
concepts.
66
Table 4.19: Stability analysis tableau for coalition sequential stability for the 1990 conflict
Overall 
Coalition 
Stability 
x x E x x x E x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
DM Stability r s s s u u s u u u u u u u u u u u u u 
Turkey 7 8 5 6 3 4 1 2 11 12 15 9 10 16 13 14 17 19 20 18 
  7 7 5 5{TS} 3 3 1 1{TS} 11 6{TI} 11 9 15 1{TI} 13 9{TI} 17 17 17 
   8 7  3{TS} 4 3 2{TS} 1{TS} 1{TSI} 12 11 15{TS} 2{TI} 1{TI} 10{TI} 17{TS} 19 19 
    8  5{TS}  4 3{TS} 2{TS} 2{TSI} 1{TS} 12 1{TSI} 1{TSI} 2{TI} 1{TSI} 9{TI} 17{TS} 20 
        1{TS} 5{TS} 3{TS} 5{TSI}  1{TS} 2{TSI} 2{TSI} 1{TSI} 9{TSI} 10{TI} 19{TS} 17{TS} 
        5{TS} 1{TSI} 5{TS} 6{TSI}  5{TS} 5{TSI} 5{TSI} 2{TSI}  1{TSI} 9{TI} 19{TS} 
         2{TSI} 1{TSI}   9{TS} 6{TSI} 9{TSI} 5{TSI}  9{TSI} 10{TI} 20{TS} 
         5{TSI} 2{TSI}    9{TSI} 10{TSI} 10{TSI}   19{TI} 9{TI} 
          5{TSI}    10{TSI}     1{TSI} 10{TI} 
                   5{TSI} 19{TI} 
                   9{TSI} 20{TI} 
                   19{TSI} 1{TSI} 
                    5{TSI} 
                    9{TSI} 
                    10{TSI} 
                    19{TSI} 
                    20{TSI} 
                     
DM Stability r u u s u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u 
Syria 1 9 17 5 19 20 10 18 2 3 11 13 4 14 12 6 15 16 8 7 
  1 1{SI} 1 17{TS} 17{TS} 1{TS} 17{TS} 10 5{TS} 3 19 3{TS} 20 1{TS} 2 13 14 4 3 
  1{TS} 9{SI} 9 1{TSI} 19{TS} 5{TS} 19{TS} 1{TS} 19{SI} 1{TS} 19{SI} 5{TS} 20{SI} 2{TS} 10 19 20 12 11 
   1{TSI}  5{TSI} 1{TSI} 9{TS} 20{TS} 5{TS} 5{TSI} 2{TS} 1{TSI} 20{SI} 1{TSI} 3{TS} 5{TS} 19{SI} 15{TS} 14{SI} 13{SI} 
   9{TSI}  9{TSI} 5{TSI}  10{SI}   3{TS} 2{TSI} 5{TSI} 2{TSI} 5{TS}  1{TSI} 20{SI} 16{SI} 15{SI} 
      9{TSI}  1{TSI}   5{TS} 5{TSI}  5{TSI} 20{SI}  2{TSI} 1{TSI} 20{SI} 19{SI} 
      19{TSI}  5{TSI}   19{SI} 9{TSI}  10{TSI} 1{TSI}  5{TSI} 2{TSI}   
        9{TSI}   1{TSI} 10{TSI}   2{TSI}  6{TSI} 5{TSI}   
        10{TSI}   2{TSI}    5{TSI}   6{TSI}   
        19{TSI}   5{TSI}       9{TSI}   
        20{TSI}          10{TSI}   
                     
                     
                     
                     
                     
                     
DM Stability r r r r r r u u u u u u u u u u u u u u 
Iraq 1 2 6 5 10 9 19 20 15 16 14 13 18 17 4 7 8 11 12 3 
       9{TI} 9{TI} 6{TI} 5{TI} 1{TI} 1{TI} 10 9 14 15 16 19 20 13 
       10{TI} 10{TI} 19{SI} 6{TI} 2{TI} 2{TI} 9{TI} 9{TI} 20{SI} 13{SI} 14{SI} 19{SI} 20{SI} 19{SI} 
       1{TSI} 19{TI} 1{TSI} 20{SI} 20{SI} 19{SI} 10{TI} 10{TI} 5{TSI} 15{SI} 16{SI} 1{TSI} 1{TSI} 5{TSI} 
       5{TSI} 1{TSI} 2{TSI} 1{TSI} 1{TSI} 1{TSI} 19{TI} 1{SI}  19{SI} 20{SI} 2{TSI} 2{TSI}  
       9{TSI} 5{TSI} 5{TSI} 2{TSI} 2{TSI} 2{TSI} 20{TI} 9{SI}    5{TSI} 5{TSI}  
        9{TSI} 6{TSI} 5{TSI} 5{TSI} 5{TSI} 10{SI} 1{TSI}       
        19{TSI}  6{TSI} 10{TSI} 9{TSI} 1{TSI} 9{TSI}       
          9{TSI}  10{TSI} 5{TSI}        
          10{TSI}  9{TSI}        
             10{TSI}        
             19{TSI}        
             20{TSI}        
 
4.3.3 Insights on the 1990 conflict
Although no rational (Nash) coalition stability is present in this conflict, states 1 and 5 are
sequentially stable by coalition sanctioning and, therefore, one can confidently state that
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the conflict will end up at one of these two states. Historically, the conflict concluded at
state 1, as will be described in the evolution of the conflict.
The construction of the di↵erent types of Graph Models in Figures 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6
give a very clear understanding of the conflict and how it can evolve by unilateral moves
by each DM as well as by a coalition. This forms a framework to communicate the conflict
to stakeholders. Moreover, di↵erent moves and counter-moves can be easily assessed and
compared especially in a complicated conflict like this one. From the analysis given in Table
4.16, one can see that there is no rational Nash stable state. However, three states have
fairly strong equilibria by sequential sanctioning and symmetric metarationality: states
1, 5, and 9. These states represent the status quo, banning PKK, and escalating the
situation unilaterally by Syria, respectively. An examination of these results eliminates the
possibility of forming a coalition, which happened historically, and none of these equilibria
includes escalation by Iraq.
After performing the in-depth coalition analysis, no new equilibrium jump is introduced
but coalition moves can be spotted and taken into account. The lesson learned from this
conflict is that one should account for coalition moves and improvements. The historical
evolution of the conflict, illustrated in Table 4.20, shows how Turkey’s action formed a
coalition between the bitter enemies, Syria and Iraq, forcing Turkey to revert to the status
quo equilibrium. Furthermore, in complicated conflicts like this one, one must be very
careful to choose the right preference information as the conflict resolutions can be highly
sensitive to preferences. This is especially true when many political factors are considered.
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Table 4.20: Historical evolution of the 1990 conflict
DM Option Status 
Quo 
       Final 
Equilibrium 
T Escalate N   N   N  N  N  
 Reduce 
Euphrates 
N   Y   Y  N  N  
S Ban PKK N   N   N  N  N  
 Escalate  N   N   Y  Y  N  
I Escalate N   N   Y  Y  N  
Label  1   3   19  17  1  
 
The conflict lasted only 3 weeks 
4.4 Strategic Investigation of the 1998 Controversy
The DMs and options for the 1998 conflict are given in Table 4.21. Turkey has two options:
escalate the situation against Syria or carry out a full invasion. Syria has two options of
stopping its support for the PKK or escalating the situation. The third party, Egypt, has
a single option of acting or not.
Table 4.21: DMs, options and descriptions for the 1998 conflictTable 11. DMs, options an  descript ons for the 1998 conflict. 
DM Option Choice Description 
Turkey Escalate Y This includes threatening Syria, and massing the troops 
on the shared border with Syria 
  N Do not escalate 
 Invade Y This includes an invasion of Syria and the declaration of 
war 
  N Do not attack 
Syria Stop 
PKK 
Support 
Y This includes banning of the PKK in Syria and the 
extradition of  PKK leader to Turkey 
 N Syria continues to support PKK rebels 
 Escalate Y This includes attacks on Turkey and its development 
projects 
  N Do not escalate 
Third 
Party 
Act Y This includes mediation and reconciliation between the 
two countries of Turkey and Syria. 
  N Do not intervene 
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The set of feasible states is provided in Table 4.22. Note that there is one infeasible
situation in which Syria can both ban PKK and escalate at the same time (mutually
exclusive options). Also notice that state 9 is an indistinguishable state if Turkey decides
to invade Syria, since a full scale war will occur and the game will end. Because the third
party played an Arbitrator role in this conflict, the situation in which it acts and Syria does
not ban the PKK, is removed. The remaining possible states or scenarios are provided in
Table 4.22. Figure 4.7 shows the Integrated Graph Model of the conflict.
Table 4.22: DMs, options and states for the 1998 conflict with the third partyTable 12. DMs, optio s and state  for the 1998 confli t with the Th rd Party. 
DM Option States 
Turkey Escalate N Y N Y N Y N Y -- 
 Invasion N N N N N N N N Y 
Syria Ban PKK N N Y Y N N Y Y -- 
 Escalate N N N N Y Y N N -- 
Third Party Act N N N N N N Y Y -- 
Label  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
  
1
3
5
2
4
6
9
7 8
Turkey
Syria
ThirdParty
Figure 4.7: Integrated Graph Model of the 1998 conflict with the third party
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In this situation, the third party acts as an Arbitrator, since the party has the power
to exclude some states (Sakamoto et al., 2005). In this conflict, the third party, Egypt,
restricted Syria’s move of not banning the PKK if it intervened. Egypt brings to the table
legitimacy and extensive experience gained through experience with the conflicts along
the Nile basin (Akanda et al., 2007). Syria was united with Egypt under the United Arab
Republic (UAR) before Syria declared independence from the UAR in the 1970s. UAR was
mostly led by the Egyptian President, Gamal Abdel Nasser. These factors combined allow
Egypt to have a say in Syria’s politics. Table 4.23 presents the preference prioritization
information for each DM in the 1998 conflict from most to least preferred. Table 4.24
indicated the ranking of states for Turkey, Syria, and the third party from most to least
preferred. Table 4.25 outlines the analysis results after inputting the foregoing information
into GMCR II.
Table 4.23: Preference prioritization information for the 1998 conflict with the third partyTable 13. Prefe ence priorit zation infor ation for the 1998 conflict with the Third Party. 
DM P# Preference Information 
(From most to least preferred) Further Explanation or Comments 
Turkey 1 Syria stops its support for PKK  
 2 Escalate the situation if Syria 
does not ban PKK 
 
 3 Invade Syria if and only if 
Syria does not ban PKK 
Turkey’s least preferred situation is 
remaining at the status quo 
Syria 1 Remain at the status quo Syria continues to support the PKK and 
Turkey does not escalate (However, this 
move is restricted by the Third Party’s 
intervention) 
 2 Turkey does not invade Syria’s least preferred situation is an 
invasion by Turkey 
 3 Escalate if Turkey escalates  
Third 
Party 
1 Syria stops its support of PKK 
and Turkey does not invade 
Syria 
Third Party is against the support of the 
rebellious PKK and wants to bring 
peace to the area 
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Table 4.24: Ranking of states for DMs in the 1998 conflict with the third partyTable 14. Ranking of states for D  in the 1998 confli t with the Th rd Party. 
DM States 
Turkey 3 7 8 4 6 9 2 1 5 
Syria 1 5 7 6 2 3 8 4 9 
Third Party 7 3 8 4 1 2 5 6 9 
 Most 
Preferred 
    Least 
Preferred 
 
  
Table 4.25: Equilibrium results for the 1998 conflict with the third partyTable 15. Equilibrium results fo  the 1998 conflict with the Third Party. 
Solution 
Concepts 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
R (Nash)      9 9  9 
GMR   9 9  9 9 9 9 
SMR   9 9  9 9 9 9 
SEQ      9 9  9 
 
  
This conflict study shows that Turkey played a more important role than Syria and
did not have to use water as a weapon. Moreover, Turkey’s superior military power puts
it at an advantage, which allowed it to threaten Syria with an invasion, thereby bringing
the game to an end. The strongest equilibrium states are 6 and 9 (Table 4.25) in which
both Syria and Turkey escalate the situation and Turkey invades eventually if the third
party does not act. However, with the mediation of the third party, a new equilibrium
came about: state 7 in which the third party acts and Syria bans the PKK. As will be
explained in Section 4.5, Syria has been put in a Pareto-inferior situation as it had to give
up other things in addition to banning the PKK. The notion of classifying the role of the
third party into Arbitrator, Coordinator, and Donor can determine, in advance, how a
third party can influence and bring about a potential resolution to the conflict. Table 4.26
shows the actual historical evolution of the 1998 conflict.
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Table 4.26: Historical evolution of the 1998 conflictTable 16. Historical olution of the 1998 conflict. 
DM Option Status 
Quo 
      Final 
Equilibrium 
Turkey Escalate N  Y   Y   N 
 Invasion N  N   N   N 
Syria Ban PKK N  N   N   Y 
 Escalate N  N   Y   N 
Third Party Act N  N   N   Y 
Label  1  2   6   7 
 
  
4.5 Fundamental Insights of Conflicts along the Eu-
phrates
The analyses provided in this chapter confirm similar conclusions drawn by Priscoli and
Wolf (2009) in their studies of Middle East water conflicts. Firstly, unilateral development
of water resources without the coordination and cooperation of other countries sharing
the same water recourse may create conflict. Secondly, if one riparian country holds the
geographical and military power, unbiased agreements are di cult to achieve. For example,
Turkey is upstream and most of the water originates in its territory. Moreover, it has
the most advanced military power (Priscoli and Wolf, 2009), giving it the upper hand in
negotiations. As a consequence, Syria ended up in a Pareto-inferior situation because it did
not ban the PKK earlier in the conflict which led to the signing of the Adana Agreement.
The terms of the agreement include more things Syria has to give up in addition to banning
PKK. For instance, Syria accepted Turkish rule over Hatay province, a long disputed land
between the two countries. Syria publicly recognized Hatay as a Turkish territory after
the Adana agreement, thereby losing two of its playing cards. The third lesson that can
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be garnered from the case in this chapter is the vital role of third party intervention in
resolving conflicts.
For the analysis part, the presented conflicts, especially the conflicts in both 1990 and
1998, can be seen as a single evolving conflict. This can serve as a base for methodology
development. In addition, a more in-depth analysis could be carried out by mixing various
approaches to conflict analysis. For instance, one can carry out hypergame analysis and
coalition analysis at the same time for the 1990 conflict.
It is clear that the conflict along the Euphrates River is indeed a complex one. Bipartite
and tripartite negotiations continue with mixed success. However, no solid agreement to
date has been reached. This chapter forms a strong motivation to develop a negotiation
methodology to carry out an in-depth analysis of third party intervention in complex
conflicts.
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Chapter 5
Modeling Negotiations in Conflict
Resolution Using Inverse GMCR
Although having a tool such as GMCR to predict and assess equilibria is important, real
life conflicts require more than that. Studies show that 70 percent of all international
conflicts since 1945 have involved third party intervention (Bercovitch and Gartner, 2006).
These interventions strive to change the course of the conflict and ultimately reach a more
desired resolution. The available models, including the standard GMCR, only predict
the likely outcomes of the conflict. The many extensions of GMCR developed over the
years aim to improve how GMCR predicts these outcomes. Another downside of the
standard GMCR is the di culty and subjectivity of obtaining preference rankings for
DMs in the conflict. Hipel (2011) states that “the most di cult hurdle to overcome in
calibrating a decision model is to obtain accurate preference information”. Many GMCR
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extensions to enrich the preference ranking procedure have been developed, such as strength
of preference (Hamouda et al., 2004, 2006), preference uncertainty (Li et al., 2004a), and
fuzzy preferences (Bashar et al., 2012; Hipel et al., 2011).
In order to address the aforementioned shortcomings, an Inverse GMCR is developed
here. A main feature of this methodology is that it does not require preference information
to model the conflict. This methodology can be utilized in many di↵erent ways. For
instance, an intervener can use it to understand how to influence one or more of the
disputants in a conflict. On the other hand, one of the disputants can utilize it to his or
her advantage by understanding how competing parties could behave in order to achieve
a desired resolution.
In addition to its use as a negotiation tool, Inverse GMCR also can determine a more
reliable prediction based on minimal preference ranking information. In standard GMCR
modeling, an analyst is usually confident about the most and least preferred states. The
dilemma usually arises with preference rankings between these two ends. Having a method-
ology such as Inverse GMCR allows for exploration of all possible scenarios for unknown
preference ranking ranges. The contents of this chapter are based on a journal paper
written by Kinsara et al. (2014c).
5.1 Overview and Objective of Inverse GMCR
GMCR forms an ideal framework to model and analyze conflicts; however, there are chal-
lenges to its applicability, especially in estimating the relative preferences of DMs involved
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in the conflict as mentioned earlier. In order to address this problem, Inverse GMCR allows
the analyst to determine how a desired resolution to the conflict can arise by generating
all possible relative preferences that achieve it.
The premise of Inverse GMCR is that the mediator needs a negotiation tool to influence
the DMs. To be valuable, this tool should contain information about what motivates each
party to undertake the selection of options leading to the resolution desired by the mediator.
Therefore, mediators can focus their resources and strategies to guide the parties toward
preferences that lead to this resolution. This tool is not just useful to third parties; DMs
may be able to take advantage of it to influence their opponent(s).
In contrast, the current GMCR methodology informs the user only about the possible
resolution of a conflict based on the input preferences. Inverse GMCR explains how this
resolution can be reached. The main objectives of Inverse GMCR are the following:
• Allow a third party to determine a desired resolution and understand how to achieve
it.
• Produce strategic information that will help mediators to influence the DMs involved
in the conflict.
• Give a range of preference rankings that measures the robustness of the conflict
resolution.
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Table 5.1: Comparison between standard GMCR and Inverse GMCR
 Standard GMCR (Prediction Tool) 
Inverse GMCR 
(Negotiation Tool) 
Purpose 
Predict possible resolution 
through determining 
equilibria 
Understand how a specific 
resolution can be achieved by 
generating scenarios 
Preference 
Requirements 
Full information is 
required 
Minimal information or  
No information at all 
Analysis type Static stability analysis Dynamic analysis 
Output Equilibrium results Scenarios and set of possible preference patterns 
Sensitivity 
Analysis 
Must be performed 
independently Is inherent 
 
5.1.1 Comparison between Standard and Inverse GMCR
The standard GMCR framework forms the foundation for Inverse GMCR. However, the
two methodologies di↵er in their requirements and outputs. Standard GMCR requires
complete preference ranking information, that is usually not easy to obtain. Moreover,
standard GMCR produces only equilibrium results based on static stability analysis as
mentioned earlier. On the other hand, Inverse GMCR introduces a modeling approach that
does not require any preference information but can make use of any available preference
information to speed and refine the results. Also, Inverse GMCR analysis is dynamic, as it
produces possible scenarios for a desired resolution to be achieved. To summarize, Inverse
GMCR utilizes the standard GMCR procedure to form a negotiation tool instead of a
prediction tool. Table 5.1 illustrates the main di↵erences between standard GMCR and
Inverse GMCR.
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5.2 Procedure and Implementation
The main di↵erence between Inverse GMCR and the standard GMCR procedure is in the
order of steps. Figure 3.1 illustrates the current procedure for applying GMCR in the real
world. A modified version, shown in Figure 5.1, illustrates how to apply Inverse GMCR.
The original procedure requires the following inputs for the conflict to be analyzed (Fang
et al., 1989, 1993):
• Decision makers (DMs).
• Options for each DM.
• Infeasible states (such as mutually exclusive situations).
• Allowable transitions.
• Relative preferences.
On the other hand, Inverse GMCR does not require the ranking of states for all DMs.
Its requirements are:
• Decision makers (DMs).
• Options for each DM.
• Infeasible states (such as mutually exclusive situations).
• Allowable transitions.
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• Desired resolution.
The result will be a list of possible state rankings that will make the desired resolution
stable under the selected stability definition.
Figure 5.1: Inverse GMCR procedure in a real world conflict (modified from (Fang et al.,
1993))
In order to formally define Inverse GMCR, one needs to furnish some definitions and
notation. First, we show how a DM’s preferences can be represented using an ordinal
payo↵ vector.
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Definition 5.2.1. The ordinal payo↵ vector of DM i, denoted by Pi, is
pi = Pi = (p
i
1, p
i
2, . . . , p
i
m), Pi 2 Rm
If sa, sb 2 S, then DM i prefers sa to sb or is indi↵erent (sa %i sb) i↵ pia   pib. An equivalent
notation is Pi(sj) = pij so that sa %i sb i↵ Pi(sa)   Pi(sb).
For example, if Pi = (5, 0, 6, 2, 6) then the ordinal payo↵ value for DM i for state
1 is equal to 5. Thus, Pi(s1) = 5, Pi(s2) = 0, Pi(s3) = 6, Pi(s4) = 2, and Pi(s5) = 6.
Because preferences are assumed to be transitive, the payo↵ vector can be translated into
a preference profile. A preference ranking for DM i is a list of feasible states ordered from
most to least preferred for DM i, where ties are allowed. In the previous example, the
preference ranking for DM i would be PRi = s3 ⇠ s5   s1   s4   s2.
Note that the same preference ranking can be represented by many di↵erent ordinal
payo↵ vectors. Two such ordinal payo↵ vectors are called equivalent.
Definition 5.2.2. If pi 2 Rm is an ordinal payo↵ vector for DM i 2 N , then (p1, p2, . . . , pn) 2
Rmn is a preference profile.
In the graph model, analysis means finding all equilibria given a preference profile. In
Inverse GMCR, the problem is to find all preference profiles under which a given state
is an equilibrium with respect to a selected stability definition. After the introduction of
preference profiles, a graph model can be denoted G = hN,S, P i where N is the list of DMs
N = {1, . . . , n}, S is the set of feasible states S = {s1, s2, ..., sm}, and P is the preference
profile P 2 Rmn.
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The inverse problem for a desired equilibrium state sE 2 S is to find all p 2 Rmn such
that state sE is stable for all DMs if the preference profile is p. The list of preference
profiles is organized into an Inverse Preference Structure (IPS).
Inverse Nash problem for sE: Find all p 2 Rmn such that sE 2 Nash(G) where
G = hN,S, P i.
Inverse SEQ problem for sE: Find p 2 Rmn such that sE 2 SEQ(G) where G =
hN,S, P i.
Inverse GMR problem for sE: Find p 2 Rmn such that sE 2 GMR(G) where G =
hN,S, P i.
Inverse SMR problem for sE: Find p 2 Rmn such that sE 2 SMR(G) where G =
hN,S, P i.
A more formal definition according to each solution concept will follow.
5.2.1 Inverse Nash Equilibrium
Definition 5.2.3. State sE is a Nash equilibrium i↵ Pi(s)  Pi(sE) for all i 2 N and all
s 2 Ri(sE).
Thus, Inverse GMCR should produce all preference profiles that make the desired state
sE a Nash equilibrium. For illustration, Inverse GMCR list according to preference profiles
(or payo↵ vectors), denoted by IPS(sE), is shown in Fig 5.2. Note that each of the T
rows is a preference profile, a combination of ordinal payo↵ vectors, that will make state
sE stable for all DMs. The possible number of profiles is denoted by T .
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IPS(sE) =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
[1p11,
1 p12, . . . ,
1 p1m] [
1p21,
1 p22, . . . ,
1 p2m] . . . [
1pn1 ,
1 pn2 , . . . ,
1 pnm]
[2p11,
2 p12, . . . ,
2 p1m] [
2p21,
2 p22, . . . ,
2 p2m] . . . [
2pn1 ,
2 pn2 , . . . ,
2 pnm]
...
...
. . .
...
[Tp11,
T p12, . . . ,
T p1m] [
Tp21,
T p22, . . . ,
T p2m] . . . [
Tpn1 ,
T pn2 , . . . ,
T pnm]
9>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>;
Figure 5.2: Representation of the inverse preference structure list for state sE
Note that hpij is player i’s ordinal payo↵ for state j in profile h.
Definition 5.2.4. A Nash IPS(sE) is a list of preference profiles, p 2 Rmn, where in each
profile, for all i 2 N , all q 2 R+i (sE) satisfies Pi(q)  Pi(sE).
5.2.2 Inverse SEQ Equilibrium
Definition 5.2.5. An SEQ IPS(sE) is a list of preference profiles, p 2 Rmn, such that for
each state q 2 R+i (sE) in the preference profile, there exists at least one state k 2 R+N i(q)
satisfying Pi(k)  Pi(sE) for all i 2 N .
In other words, the combination of payo↵ vectors must ensure that for each UI a DM can
take, there exists at least one sanction that will put the original player in a less preferred
state. Please note that the notation N   i means all DMs other than i.
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5.2.3 Inverse GMR Equilibrium
Definition 5.2.6. A GMR IPS(sE) is a list of preference profiles, p 2 Rmn, such that for
each state q 2 R+i (sE) in the preference profile, there exists at least one state k 2 RN i(q)
satisfying Pi(k)  Pi(sE) for all i 2 N .
5.2.4 Inverse SMR Equilibrium
Definition 5.2.7. An SMR IPS(sE) is a list of preference profiles, p 2 Rmn, such that for
each state q 2 R+i (sE) in the preference profile, there exists at least one state k 2 RN i(q)
satisfying Pi(k)  Pi(sE) and all h 2 Ri(k) satisfy Pi(h)  Pi(sE) for all i 2 N .
5.2.5 Approaches to Implementation
In order to implement Inverse GMCR, two approaches were investigated. The first was
the brute-force method. As the name suggests, this technique exhaustively tests each
possible preference profile for each DM against the desired equilibrium. Since the number
of possible preference rankings is fairly large, a decision support system was designed to
implement this concept. The number of iterations required for a model, assuming strict
ordinal preferences, is given by (m!)n where m is the number of feasible states and n is
the number of DMs. Any combination of preference rankings for all DMs (i.e. preference
profile) that achieves the desired equilibrium will be saved in a list. The list can be used to
derive tactics to influence the course of the conflict. Although generating an extensive list
and deriving insights were possible for small models, a more e cient and comprehensive
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approach is obviously desirable. Therefore, a second approach was designed after observing
the patterns produced by the brute-force method. It was clear that results followed certain
rules which can be defined more formally, as outlined in the aforementioned sections.
Pseudo-codes for both algorithms are provided in the next section.
5.2.6 Algorithms
Brute-Force Method
In order carry out the brute-force calculations, two algorithms were used. Algorithm 5.1
is utilized to generate all possible preference profiles for the conflict model and then filter
the profiles that make a desired state a Nash equilibrium. As mentioned in Section 5.2.5,
there will be (m!)n preference profiles where m is the number of feasible states and n is the
number of DMs. In order to test each profile for Nash equilibrium, the MBL-N function,
illustrated in Algorithm 5.2, is called. It generates a list of states that must be less preferred
than the desired equilibrium state, SE, for each DM. Then, if any state in the MBL-N list
has a higher ordinal payo↵ than SE in a given preference profile, the program will reject
that preference profile. All other profiles satisfy the Nash criteria, and are stored in the
IPS matrix. The steps involved in generating the IPS matrix are outlined as follows:
Step 1: Obtain DMs (N ), feasible states (F ), and desired equilibrium (SE).
Step 2: Generate all possible combinations of preference profiles (PList).
Step 3: Create an empty matrix (IPS ).
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Step 4: Call the function (MBL-N(SE)) to generate the list of states that must be less
preferred than SE.
Step 5: Check each preference profile h in PList. If the end of the list is reached, stop
and go to Step 8.
Step 6: Check each state j in (MBL-N(SE)) whether it is more preferred for any DM i
in N . If yes, then disregard the current preference profile and check next profile. Otherwise
go to Step 7.
Step 7: Add the current preference profile to the IPS matrix.
Step 8: Return the IPS matrix.
The steps involved in generating the MBL-N list are outlined as follows:
Step 1: Obtain the reachability matrix for each DM dm.R.
Step 2: Create an empty matrix (MBL-N ).
Step 3: For each DM add the list of reachable states from SE for that DM toMBL N .
Step 4: Return the (MBL-N ) list.
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Algorithm 5.1 Generate a Nash IPS for State SE
F  Feasible States
N  DMs
SE  Desired Equilibrium
PList All possible combinations of preference profiles
IPS  [ ]
Call MBL-N(SE)
for each prefrence profile h in PList do
isEquilibrium  True
for each DM i in N do
for each state j in MBL-N(SE) do
if hpij >
hpiE then
isEquilibrium  False
end if
end for
end for
if isEquilibrium=True then
IPS  IPS + h
end if
end for
return IPS
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Algorithm 5.2 Generate MBL-N(SE)
Require: dm.R  Reachability Matrix F ⇥ F for each DM
function MBL-N(SE)
MBL-N  [ ]
for each DM i in N do
MBL-N  MBL-N + i.R(SE)
end for
return MBL-N
end function
Improved Method
It was clear that generating all possible preference profiles and testing them one-by-one are
both time and memory intensive, and not feasible for larger models. A conflict model with
only five states and two DMs will have (5!)2 = 14, 400 permutations. Adding one more state
produces (6!)2 = 518, 400 permutations, making computational complexity undesirably
high, as explained later in Section 6.9.2. However, after observing the patterns of multiple
examples using the brute-force method, an improved method involving the specification of
rules making a desired state an equilibrium was developed. Algorithm 5.3 illustrates the
process of generating rules that make a desired state, SE, a Nash equilibrium.
Algorithm 5.3 Generate Nash Inverse Rules for State SE
F  Feasible States
N  DMs
SE  Desired Equilibrium
Call MBL-N(SE)
for each DM i in N do
PRINT State SE must be more preferred than all Sj 2 i.R(SE)
end for
Suppose in a graph model with 2 DMs and 6 states, the brute-force method (worst
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case) involves (6!)2 = 518, 400 comparisons and may produce a list of up to 86,400 to make
a desired state a Nash equilibrium. However, the improved method involves only four steps
and produces only two statements explaining the same results. Refer to Section 5.3 for the
Syria-Iraq conflict as an example.
Similar algorithms have been developed for other solution concepts and produce similar
gains in computational time and memory requirements. The improved algorithms were all
implemented in GMCR+ as will be explained in Chapter 6.
5.3 Application
The water conflict between Syria and Iraq in 1975 is explained in Section 4.1.1. In order
to illustrate the Inverse GMCR, this conflict will be re-investigated.
5.3.1 Standard GMCR Results
The standard GMCR analysis for this conflict is provided in detail in Section 4.2. As
mentioned earlier in this research, standard GMCR requires preference information (or
ranking of states). Since this model is fairly small, it is not di cult to derive the preference
information from the conflict background, although it remains subjective. The ranking of
states for this conflict is shown in Table 4.6. Running the standard GMCR analysis predicts
the most likely outcome in terms of equilibria based on the input preferences. Table 4.9
shows the equilibrium results according to di↵erent behavior patterns. Nash and Sequential
Stability (SEQ) are the strongest stability definitions, meaning that DMs are not motivated
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to deviate from a particular state if the conflict reaches it. General Metarationality (GMR)
and Symmetric Metarationality (SMR) are not as strong. More formal definitions and the
relationships among the di↵erent stability definitions are mentioned earlier and can be
found in Fang et al. (1989).
The objective of the standard GMCR analysis is to determine the equilibrium states,
the states from which no DM is motivated to move. Therefore, once an equilibrium is
attained, the conflict will probably end there. As mentioned in the historical background,
the conflict reached state 6 in which both Syria and Iraq go to war, a strong equilibrium
as shown in Table 4.9.
The standard GMCR methodology lacks the ability to determine a more desired reso-
lution and explain how it can be achieved. This example also illustrates the subjectivity
in determining the ranking of states.
5.3.2 Inverse GMCR Results
The goal of any intervention is to bring about a better resolution for all parties to the
conflict. Inverse GMCR acts as a negotiation tool allowing the analyst to determine a
more desirable resolution. In this particular case, a more desired resolution would be state
2 in which both Syria and Iraq stop escalating and water is released to Iraq. The objective
of Inverse GMCR is to provide mediators with strategic information in order to help them
focus their e↵orts e↵ectively and e ciently. Here, the mediation aims to influence Syria
to release water and stop escalating. Using Inverse GMCR, state 2 is chosen as a desired
equilibrium and the decision support system was used to run the analysis. The findings
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indicate that 420 possible preference profiles can achieve the desired resolution. After
analyzing these results, two meaningful patterns were identified that lead the conflict to
the desired equilibrium:
1. Nash Stability: if and only if Syria prefers state 2 to states 1 and 3 (240 profiles).
2. Sequential Stability: (180 profiles).
(a) if Iraq prefers state 4 to state 1, then Syria must have state 4 less preferred than
2.
(b) or if Iraq prefers state 6 to state 3, then Syria must have state 6 less preferred
than 2.
In other words, state 2 will be the resolution to the conflict if and only if (1) Syria prefers
not to escalate or (2) being attacked by Iraq is less preferred for Syria. Having this strategic
information could be vital to the mediators as they focus their e↵orts at influencing Syria
to change its preference ranking. Consequently, the final outcome of the conflict would
change.
The diagram in Figure 5.3 illustrates the inverse status quo tree in which state 2 is
clearly reachable from state 6. Usually, when all moves in a conflict are reversible, states
can be reachable using all DMs level. However, this tool becomes very valuable when
irreversible moves are introduced to a conflict.
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Figure 5.3: Inverse Status Quo Diagram for the Syria-Iraq conflict
5.3.3 Insights for the Syria-Iraq Conflict
The historical evolution of the conflict is illustrated in Table 5.2. Note that state numbers
with an asterisk (*) indicate mediation. In Inverse GMCR context, Iraq as a DM or a
third party mediator can influence Syria in two ways:
• Making the escalation option for Syria less preferred.
• Making the attack option by Iraq disastrous for Syria.
In this conflict, Saudi Arabia mediated the conflict by contributing to a basin fund that
would finance irrigation reform (Akanda et al., 2007). Therefore, escalation by Syria be-
came less preferred as it risked losing this fund, in addition to other factors related to
international pressure and war costs.
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Table 5.2: Historical evolution of the Syria-Iraq conflict
TABLE III. ACTUAL EVOLUTION OF THE 1975 CONFLICT
DM Option Status
Quo
Intermediary
States Equilibrium
Syria Release
Water
N N N N Y
Escalate N N Y Y N
Iraq Attack N Y Y Y N
Third
Party
Act N N N Y Y
Label 1 4 6 6* 2*
This conflict emphasizes how third party intervention can change the course of the
conflict and bring about a better resolution. The strategy of intervention is as important
as the intervention itself if not more. Therefore, a tool to provide insights on how to achieve
a desired resolution is valuable. Inverse GMCR is a strategic tool that utilizes GMCR as a
negotiation tool rather than as a prediction tool. Moreover, its information requirements
are minimal.
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5.4 Chapter Summary
This chapter contains the main contribution of this research. The standard GMCR and
other conflict models can be used only to predict the likely outcome of a conflict. Inverse
GMCR, on the other hand, utilizes GMCR as a negotiation tool rather than a prediction
tool. The framework, algorithms, and formal definitions of Inverse GMCR are outlined
and applied to the conflict discussed in Chapter 4. The main highlights of this chapter are
summarized below:
1. Unlike standard GMCR, Inverse GMCR does not require DMs’ preference informa-
tion, thus allowing it to help analysts in modeling conflicts with minimal information.
Table 5.1 compares standard and Inverse GMCR.
2. The standard GMCR methodology informs the user only about the possible reso-
lutions of a conflict based on the input preferences. In contrast, Inverse GMCR
explains how a desired resolution can be reached.
3. In order to simplify the definitions for Inverse GMCR, DMs’ ordinal payo↵ vectors
are organized into a new notation called the preference profile. The product of In-
verse GMCR is referred to as the Inverse Preference Structure (IPS). Mathematical
representations and formal definitions for both preference profiles and the IPS are
formulated.
4. The four basic graph model stability definitions, Nash, GMR, SMR, and SEQ are
redefined for Inverse GMCR as Nash IPS, GMR IPS, SMR IPS, and SEQ IPS,
respectively.
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Chapter 6
Comprehensive Decision Support
System
The introduction of the inverse approach makes the need for a DSS obvious. Solving
problems by hand is possible but tiresome, time consuming, and error-prone. First, a code
to test each preference profile was developed. This is called the brute-force method and
the matrix approach to GMCR allows for faster processing (Xu et al., 2007; Xu, 2009).
The last DSS, GMCR II, was developed by Peng back in 1999 (Peng, 1999). Until recently,
no significant update was made to GMCR II, even though the program had issues that
sometimes caused it to crash or display error messages. A project to combine both the
logical and matrix approaches into a more robust and flexible decision support system was
initiated by Oskar Petersons and Rami Kinsara under the supervision of Prof. Keith Hipel
and Prof. D. Marc Kilgour. The objective of this system is to overcome the limitations in
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the previous version and also add new extensions and capabilities that it did not support.
A main objective of the new system is to include the Inverse GMCR methodology. Two
important features of the software are the ability to narrate output results and draw graph
models.
6.1 Framework of the Decision Support System GMCR+
DSSs are meant to facilitate the application of theoretical methodologies and definitions,
especially for non-specialized practitioners and researchers. A modern DSS is defined as
“an interactive, flexible, and adaptable computer-based information system, especially de-
veloped for supporting the solution of a non-structured management problem for improved
decision making. It utilizes data, provides an easy-to-use interface, and allows for the
DM’s own insights” (Turban, 1995). Therefore, GMCR+ is built with a human-centric
framework to allow intuitive manipulation and interaction of conflict models.
The overall structure of GMCR+ is illustrated in Figure 6.1. The main visible com-
ponent is the friendly GUI where all interactions between the user and the system take
place. This structure ensures robustness of the back end and makes it easy to track any
errors as each module is completely independent of other modules. Also, this structure
allows the system to be universal and workable on any platform (Mac, Windows, or Linux).
Finally, the modular design of the GMCR+ system provides the flexibility of adding new
advancements in the form of modules to the DSS.
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User / 
Analyst
Graphical User 
Interface (GUI)
Modelling Module
• DMs
• Options
• Infeasible States
• Options’ Reversibility
• Preferences
• Coalitions
• Status Quo
• Desired Equilibria
Output Module
• Equilibria Results
• Results Reporting and 
Narration 
• Graph Model 
Visualization
• Inverse GMCR Patterns
• Status Quo Analysis 
Results
Analysis Engine
• Stability Analysis [Using both 
Logical and Matrix Approach]
• Coalition Analysis
• Status Quo Analysis
• Inverse GMCR analysis
Figure 6.1: GMCR+ Structure
The following list describes three main situations where the methodology depicted in Figure
6.1 can be used:
• A tool for analysis and simulation for a DM or a DM’s agent in a conflict: As a
decision aid, GMCR+ can be used to evaluate outcomes of a conflict as various
strategic initiatives are implemented.
• A tool for communication and analysis in mediation: To attain a win-win resolution,
a mediator can use GMCR+ to analyze possible consequences of small changes in
positions made by DMs in addition to utilizing the novel Inverse GMCR.
• A tool for analysis for a third-party analyst: For example, a government may wish
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to determine the strategic e↵ectiveness of another government’s policy, although it
is not itself directly involved.
The GMCR is a distinctive systems engineering process for systematically studying a di-
verse range of disputes. Published literature documents case studies of applying GMCR
to real-world conflicts in a variety of di↵erent fields, including brownfields (polluted indus-
trial or military land) (Hipel et al., 2010; Yousefi et al., 2010b), construction management
(Kassab et al., 2010; Yousefi et al., 2010a), aquaculture (Noakes et al., 2003, 2005), bulk
water exports (Obeidi et al., 2002; Hipel et al., 2008), First Nations (Obeidi et al., 2006),
international trade (Hipel and Walker, 2011), military and peace support (Kilgour et al.,
1998), sustainable development (Ghanbarpour and Hipel, 2009; Hipel and Walker, 2011),
and water resources management (Hipel, 1992; Hipel and McLeod, 1994; Gopalakrishnan
et al., 2005; Nandalal and Hipel, 2007; Madani and Hipel, 2011). This flexible methodology
is applied to the Cuban Missile Crisis in Section 6.7 to demonstrate how easy it is to apply
this well-designed DSS technology in practice and to point out its many benefits for users.
6.2 Conflict Specification
One of the GMCR+ project’s central goals is the creation of a simple and flexible system to
model conflicts in an electronic format. In pursuit of this goal, identifying the parameters
of the conflict and making logical connections between them is required. Since the DSS is
programmed using an object oriented language, the conflict parameters will be referred to
as objects. Figure 6.2 illustrates the top-level specifications (i.e. objects) of the conflict
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model as implemented in GMCR+. In the following subsections, each object is explained
and its properties are illustrated.
Conflict Model 
Objects 
Infeasible 
Conditions 
Options 
DMs 
Name 
Reversibility 
Option selections 
Name 
Options Controlled 
Preferences 
Direct Specifications 
Preferred Conditions 
Option selections 
Coalitions 
DMs (Members of a coalition) 
Figure 6.2: Conflict Specifications Hierarchy in GMCR+
Typically, DMs are identified before options, as demonstrated in the standard GMCR
procedure shown in Figure 3.1. However, options will be discussed as the root of the
conflict model, which better reflects the structure of GMCR+.
6.2.1 Option Objects
Each option within a conflict is represented by an object. This object contains all of the
defining attributes as follows:
Option Name
A simple identifier that is readable to humans which is used while modeling the conflict
and when displaying results.
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Reversibility
An option may be On or O↵ (selected or not). An option is reversible if it is permissible
to move back and forth between the two option selections. An option is irreversible if it is
permissible to move in only one of these directions.
A list containing all of the options within a conflict is part of the top-level specification
of that conflict. References to the option objects contained within that master list appear
in three instances:
• DM objects (to allow a DM to have control over an option)
• Infeasible conditions (making a condition dependent on option selections)
• Preferred conditions (within a DM’s preferences)
The last two instances will be clarified in the following subsection.
6.2.2 Condition Objects
A group of option selections is called a condition. For example, consider a model of five
options. The complete set of states where no option selection is made could be represented
as “- - - - -”. A pattern in which the second option is chosen and the fourth option
is not chosen is described as “- Y - N -”. Conditions of this form are used in the two
aforementioned instances: determining infeasible states and specifying preferences using
preference prioritization.
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6.2.3 Infeasible Conditions
A conflict’s infeasible states are described through a list of conditions mentioned earlier.
All states for which one or more of the infeasible conditions is true are removed from the
model before analysis is carried out. Specifying the infeasible states in a conflict through
the use of infeasible conditions allows a large number of related infeasible states to be
described more easily.
6.2.4 DM Objects
Each DM within a conflict is represented by an object. This object contains all of the
defining attributes of the DM as follows:
DM Name
A simple identifier that is readable to humans which is used while modeling the conflict
and when displaying results.
Options Controlled
A list of references to options (contained in the top level specifications) that a DM controls.
Each option is controlled by one and only one DM.
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Preferences
This refers to the ordering of conflict states from most preferred to least preferred for
each DM. This information can be inputted using direct specification or using preference
prioritization conditions. GMCR+ represents preferences by assigning payo↵ values to each
state for each DM. A higher payo↵ value indicates a greater preference for that state by that
DM. A user can directly specify preferences by providing a list of all states, ordered from
most preferred to least preferred. Equally preferred states can be indicated by grouping
them together with brackets and the DSS will then assign payo↵s accordingly.
Another way to specify preferences is a qualitative tool utilizing the preference priori-
tization method, which uses preferred conditions. When using preference prioritization to
assign payo↵s, preferred conditions are specified for each DM. These conditions are ordered
from the most preferred conditions to the least preferred conditions. Weights are assigned
to each of the conditions, and a state’s payo↵ is calculated by summing the weights of all
conditions it satisfies.
6.2.5 Coalitions Objects
A coalition is formed through the grouping of two or more DMs. A coalition of DMs has
control over all options controlled by any member of the coalition. A move is only preferred
for a coalition if it is preferred by all of the coalition’s members. The defining property of
a coalition is the list of DMs (i.e. members). A DM may only belong to one coalition, and
a DM may not act independently while part of a coalition.
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6.3 Conflict Data Processing
In this section, algorithms and pseudocodes for how GMCR+ processes the aforementioned
conflict specifications are outlined.
6.3.1 Removing Infeasible States
Infeasible states must be removed from a conflict before useful analysis can be performed.
Since infeasible states are represented through conditions, the list of feasible states can be
obtained through a subtraction process.
A condition with no option selection specified (i.e. all possible options can be either
taken or not) is referred to as a “null condition”. A null condition includes the complete
set of mathematically possible states (given by the expression 2↵ where ↵ is the number of
options in a conflict model). The list of feasible states in a conflict model can be expressed
as a set of conditions. Starting with the null condition, the list of conditions that describe
the feasible states of a game can be obtained through Algorithm 6.4. Please note that
Algorithm 6.5 is called within Algorithm 6.4. The results provided by the use of these
algorithms is the set of feasible states for the conflict, referred to as F .
6.3.2 Preference Prioritization
Preference prioritization is the process by which a ranked list of preferred conditions can be
translated into payo↵ values for each state according to each DM. In order to perform the
preference prioritization, the first step is to establish a weight for each preferred condition.
103
Algorithm 6.4 Calculate Feasible States
F  null condition
G Set of infeasible conditions
W   
for each condition g in G do
for each condition f in F do
X  subtract(f, g)
W  W [X
end for
F  W
W   
end for
Algorithm 6.5 Calculate X   Y
function Subtract(x,y)
if X \ Y =   then
return X
end if
W   
Z  X
for each option i do
if Y [i] == 0 0 then
CONTINUE
end if
if Z[i] == 0 0 then
A Z
A[i] NOT Y [i]
W  W [ A
Z[i] Y [i]
end if
end for
return W
end function
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Given a user-provided list of conditions, P , ordered from most to least important, payo↵
values can be assigned according to the following procedure:
• Algorithm 6.6 outlines the method used to weigh the conditions in GMCR+. Each
condition is given a weight of 2|P | i, where |P | is the length of the user provided list
of conditions, and i is the position of the condition on the list.
• After all the conditions have been weighted, all feasible states within the conflict
model are then scored against these conditions as outlined in Algorithm 6.7. The
payo↵ for a state according to each DM is the sum of the weights of all conditions
that are satisfied by the state.
As each DM has a unique set of preferred conditions, which will yield unique payo↵ values
for each state, this procedure must be performed for every DM.
Algorithm 6.6 Weight Preferred Conditions
P = User-Provided list of Preferred Conditions
for each condition p in P and index i in |P | do . |P | is the length of the user provided
list
p.weight 2|P | i . p.weight is the weight of the condition p
end for
6.3.3 Direct Ranking Handling
An alternative method for specifying preferences is through direct specification. Direct
specification is the manual ordering of states from the most preferred to least preferred
state for each DM. The user-entered preference rankings are converted to payo↵ values
using Algorithm 6.8.
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Algorithm 6.7 Score States
F = List of Feasible States
P = User-Provided list of Preferred Conditions
for state f in F do
f.payo↵ 0
for condition p in P do
if f satisfies p then
f.payo↵ f.payo↵+p.weight
end if
end for
end for
Algorithm 6.8 Convert Preference Ranking to Payo↵ Values
R User-entered preference ranking
for each state number r in R and index i in |R| do
r.payo↵ |R|  i
end for
6.3.4 Reachability Matrix
The reachability matrix contains information central to all analysis capabilities of the
GMCR+ system. For each DM, an |F |⇥ |F | reachability matrix is constructed, where |F |
is the number of feasible states in the conflict model. If state j is reachable from state i
by a DM, then entry [i, j] of the reachability matrix for that DM is assigned the payo↵ of
state j for that DM. If state j is not reachable from state i by a DM, then the [i, j] entry
is undefined. Figure 6.3 is an example for a 3-state model where a DM has a move from
state s1 to state s2 that has a payo↵ of 3. On the other hand, a move from state s2 to
state s3 has a payo↵ of  5. There is no possible move from state s3 to state s1, but a move
from state s1 to state s3 has a payo↵ of 1 and the move is irreversible.
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!! !! !!!!!!!! 3 1−3 −55 !
! !
Figure 6.3: Reachability Matrix Example
Using this format allows both reachability and payo↵ information to be co-located and
used in di↵erent GMCR+ procedures and analyses.
6.3.5 Inverse Status Quo Analysis
Every real world conflict has a starting point from which the conflict evolves. This point
or state is called status quo (Fang et al., 1993). Depending on the status quo, a potential
equilibrium may or may not be reached.
Li et al. developed algorithms and formal definitions to inspect the attainability of a
potential resolution (equilibrium) from a certain state (status quo) (Li et al., 2004b, 2005).
An inverse approach to determine the required starting points in order to attain a desired
equilibria is achieved by tracking the evolution of the conflict backward from a desired
equilibrium to the status quo states. This feature is illustrated in Sections 6.6.1 and 6.6.2.
6.4 Analysis Engines
There are four independent “solvers” within GMCR+: the logical solver, the matrix solver,
the inverse solver, and the goal seeker. GMCR+ utilizes both logical and matrix approaches
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to determine and calculate the stability of states. This allows the system to extract in-
sightful information while being fast and e cient in analyzing conflict models.
The Logical Solution Engine in GMCR+ calculates the stability of each state for every
DM according to the four solution concepts introduced in Section 3.3: Nash, SEQ, GMR,
and SMR. Overall conflict equilibria can be determined based on individual stabilities.
Moreover, the engine can generate a narration of the stability for any given state and DM.
This insightful narration provides a clear picture of what sanctioning moves or unilateral
improvements (UIs) are directly responsible for the stability or instability of a state.
In addition to the Logical Solution Engine, the back end of the system utilizes the
Matrix Approach by Xu et al. (2007); Xu (2009). The advantage of using the Matrix
Approach is the increased computational speed due to the e ciency of computers when
dealing with matrices versus logical loops. However, if the user demands insights for a
specific state, then the logical approach is utilized to provide the narration.
An ‘inverse solver’ subsystem to utilize the above engines is implemented to incorporate
Inverse GMCR. Inverse GMCR is a new extension to the original GMCR (Kinsara et al.,
2012, 2013a,b) in which GMCR is utilized as a negotiation tool rather than a prediction tool
as explained in Chapter 5. Through the application of the stability concept definitions and
analysis of the reachability matrix, it is possible to generate a list of conditions that must
be satisfied by the DMs’ preferences to lead to an equilibrium at a given state. The engine
can produce a list of the conditions that must be satisfied to produce an equilibrium under
any of the basic stability concepts: Nash, SEQ, GMR, and SMR. Moreover, the engine can
utilize the definitions discussed in Section 5.2 to produce patterns for the generated list.
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Finally, the ‘Goal Seeking’ solution engine is an adaptation of the inverse solution
engine. It allows the user to specify a variety of di↵erent states that are desired either
to be “stable” or “unstable”. The engine uses the definitions of the stability concepts to
determine the conditions that must be satisfied for all of these defined “goals” of stability
or instability to be achieved. It also allows the user to interactively browse through the
tree of moves below a selected “status quo”.
6.5 Graphical User Interface
The GUI for GMCR+ was created in python, using the tkinter user interface package.
The basic interface, shown in Figure 6.4, includes a large navigation bar at the top of the
screen. This bar displays each of the logical steps in the modeling of a conflict, and allows
the user to easily move between them. At the top left of the screen, the user can find
standard utility buttons to load, save, and create new conflict models. The remainder of
the screen is used to display and edit information related to the active step of the modeling
process. To the right edge of the screen, a column provides a quick reference about the
current step of the modeling process and how to use the interface.
6.5.1 Decision Makers and Options
This is the first step in conflict modeling where the user or analyst defines the DMs and
their options in the conflict. The full list of DMs in the conflict is shown to the left of
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Figure 6.4: GUI for GMCR+
the screen as shown in Figure 6.5. Clicking on a DM’s name will select it, displaying the
DM’s associated options in a list to the right. While a DM or option is selected, it can be
deleted, or its name can be modified. Buttons at the bottom of the screen allow the order
of DMs and options to be changed, and new DMs or options to be added to the conflict.
The information panel at the right edge of the screen displays the number of defined DMs,
options, and the total number of states that would be in the game if no infeasible states
were removed.
6.5.2 Infeasible States
After defining DMs and options, the program will generate a list of all possible states.
There are usually infeasible states that must be removed as explained earlier in Sections
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Figure 6.5: DMs and Options Screen
6.2.3 and 6.3.1. The infeasible states screen (Figure 6.6) allows the user to create conditions
specifying infeasible states to be removed.
Figure 6.6: Infeasible States Screen
The panel to the left contains a set of toggle buttons where option selections can be made
to specify an infeasible condition. Clicking “remove as infeasible condition” will remove
all states satisfying this condition from the conflict and display the infeasible condition
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along with the number of removed states in the middle of the screen. Clicking “remove
as mutually exclusive options” generates a list of conditions prohibiting any states where
two or more of the chosen option selections are taken. For example, consider a person
with three options: eat, sleep, and breathe. A person can’t eat and sleep at the same time.
Moreover, a person can’t eat or sleep without also breathing. Table 6.1 outlines all possible
states combinations for this example. Four states are infeasible in this example: 2, 3, 4,
and 8. In order to remove them, an analyst would have to input at least three conditions
manually:
• Eat and sleep
• Eat and not breathe
• Sleep and not breathe
However, using the mutually exclusive button, an analyst can generate this list of
conditions by selecting Eat, Sleep, and not Breathe and clicking on “remove as mutually
exclusive options”.
Table 6.1: Example for mutually exclusive options
; ; ; ;
; ; ; ;
; ; ; ;
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The feasible states are displayed on the right of the infeasible conditions panel as shown
in Figure 6.6. The set of feasible states can be displayed either as a list of feasible conditions,
as a full list of feasible states in YN format, or as ordered and decimal state numbers. On
the right edge of the screen, an information panel displays the original number of states in
the conflict, the number of states removed, and the number of feasible states remaining.
Below that is a brief set of instructions for using the interface.
6.5.3 Irreversible Moves
In this step, an analyst can define the reversibility of each option. By default, all options in
the conflict are displayed with a two-headed arrow pointing between ‘Y’ and ‘N’ denoting
that all moves are reversible. Clicking the arrow toggles the direction of reversibility. In
this way, the user or analyst can leave the option as reversible, or define the direction of
irreversibility. All moves in Figure 6.7 are reversible except that of Air Strike.
Figure 6.7: Irreversible Moves Screen
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6.5.4 Preferences
Preferences for DMs can be specified through preferred conditions or through direct ranking
of states as mentioned previously in Sections 6.3.2 and 6.3.3. The preferred conditions
method allows the analyst to define preference prioritization conditions to make the ranking
of states easier and more intuitive. Direct ranking allows the analyst to fine tune the results
from prioritization or assumes the analyst is certain about the ranking of states for each
DM.
Prioritization
As explained earlier in Section 6.2.2, a condition is a set of option selections describing a
group of states. By specifying conditions that are preferred by a DM and ordering these
conditions by importance, a ranking of states can be generated using the methodology
described in Section 6.3.2.
Figure 6.8: Preference Prioritization Screen
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The panel to the left of the screen in Figure 6.8 is a table with all DMs and their
corresponding preference rankings. Clicking on any DM will change its color to green and
allow the preferences for that DM to be modified. A user can click “Done” to clear the
DM selection. The panel in the middle includes toggle buttons for all DMs and their
options. In order to add a preferred condition, a user will make option selections and can
either add them directly as a preferred condition or move them to a staging area where
multiple conditions can be added together with equal weight. The right panel of the screen
displays the preferred conditions for the selected DM and the weights associated with those
conditions.
A large table displaying the conflict in option form occupies the bottom of the screen
in Figure 6.8. The states are ordered according to their ranking for the active DM. The
table also displays the payo↵ value of each state according to the active DM. If no DM is
selected, the states are ordered based on state number and payo↵ values for all DMs are
shown.
Preference Ranking
A user may wish to fine-tune the ranking of states after performing preference prioritization
or simply entering preference information directly. At the top of the screen in Figure
6.9 is a large button which allows a user to enable manual preference ranking. This is
accomplished by modifying the preference rankings shown for the DMs in the fields below.
States are listed using their ordered numbers, and equally preferred states can be indicated
by enclosing them in square brackets. In the middle of the screen, a large text box displays
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feedback on the validity of the entered preference rankings. Each preference ranking must
contain each state once and only once to be considered valid. At the bottom of the
screen, an option form table for the conflict is shown, similar to that on the Preference
Prioritization screen. If the user wishes to revert changes to preferences made on the
Preference Ranking screen, they can return to the Preference Prioritization screen, and
click the large button that appears at the top of the screen.
Figure 6.9: Preference Ranking Screen
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6.5.5 Equilibrium Results
Figure 6.4 illustrates the Equilibria Results screen. The top of the screen shows the results
of equilibria calculations for all states and solution concepts in an option form table for the
conflict model similar to that on the preferences screens. Moreover, an analyst can examine
the equilibria for coalitions by merging possible coalitions in square brackets to the top
of the screen. To the right of the screen is the analysis narration panel, which allows an
analyst to check for individual stability by selecting a DM, state, and solution concept and
the process used to determine that individual stability or instability is explained. At the
bottom of this screen, an option to launch a visualizer is available which is explained in
Section 6.6.
6.5.6 Inverse GMCR
This screen deals with one of the novel additions to GMCR as mentioned in the introduction
and in Section 6.4. The screen contains a control panel to the left as seen in Figure 6.10.
This control panel allows the analyst to specify a desired equilibrium state. Furthermore,
an analyst can select a preference variance range for each DM and then perform the Inverse
GMCR calculations. Required conditions for stability are explained to the right for each
solution concept. Long form results can be displayed on the bottom by selecting to display
all permutations in the control panel and can be filtered by the solution concepts check
boxes. This is a useful addition allowing analysts to perform extensive sensitivity analysis
on preferences.
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Figure 6.10: Inverse GMCR Screen
6.6 Presentation of Results and Post Analysis Tools
Web technologies present a wide array of opportunities for easily creating and distributing
visualizations of information. The complexities of a conflict’s graph model are often most
easily understood when presented in a visual form, and so the following tools were created
to accompany GMCR+, facilitating presentation and allowing deeper analysis.
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6.6.1 Graphical Representation
Within the equilibria results screen described in Section 6.5.5 is a button to launch a
visualizer. Clicking this button will launch a web application within the GMCR+ system
allowing the analyst to see the actual graph of the conflict model as shown in Figure 6.11.
The default view is a tree diagram illustrating a status quo analysis diagram. The top of
the tree denotes the status quo and the branches are the possible unilateral moves from
that state by each DM. Lines are color and dash coded for each DM. Hovering the mouse
on any state shades all states within the tree.
Figure 6.11: Conflict Model Tree Diagram
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Hovering the mouse at the bottom of the screen displays an option form table for the
conflict model. Hovering the mouse along the left of the screen shows the display options
panel as shown in Figure 6.12. This panel allows an analyst to change the display method
between a tree and a graph diagram. Furthermore, multiple options such as selecting a
specific DM, showing UIs only, and specifying the tree depth can be adjusted.
Figure 6.12: Display Options Panel for Tree and Graph Diagrams
Switching to the graph diagram mode will show the actual graph model for the conflict
at hand as shown in Figure 6.13
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Figure 6.13: Conflict Model Graph Diagram
6.6.2 Post Analysis
This is the last screen in the GMCR+ system as illustrated in Figure 6.14. In this screen
an analyst can specify coalitions within the control panel on the left of the screen, similar
to the equilibria results screen mentioned in Section 6.5.5. In addition, this screen has two
main submodules described in the following subsections.
Status Quo Analysis
In the control panel, an analyst can choose a specific state to act as a status quo for the
conflict and carry out the analysis from it. The middle panel will automatically show the
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Figure 6.14: Post Analysis Screen
selected state as the top of the tree with a ‘+’ sign to expand the branch. Clicking the
‘+’ sign expands the branch into reachable states and UIs are shaded green. This feature
allows the analyst to know if a possible equilibrium is reachable from the status quo and
whether it is reachable solely by UIs. This information is also given in the narration panel
to the right of the screen.
Goal Technique
This tool is an extensive version of the Inverse GMCR mentioned in Section 6.5.6. An
analyst can experiment with di↵erent scenarios by setting particular states to be stable
while avoiding other states. Whether these choices are possible or not is explained in the
right panel and how they can be achieved if possible is narrated as well.
6.7 Case Study 1: Cuban Missile Crisis
In order to illustrate the capabilities of GMCR+, an international political conflict is
summarized and then analyzed using GMCR+.
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6.7.1 Background
The Cuban Missile Crisis between the United States (US) and the Union of the Soviet
Socialist Republics (USSR) in October 1962 is used to demonstrate the capabilities of the
DSS GMCR+ (??Fraser and Hipel, 1984; Hipel, 2011). The crisis was the closest that
the USSR and US came to nuclear conflict, but it was averted due to the restraint and
intelligence of the DMs on both sides. After Fidel Castro overthrew the Batista regime
in 1959, there was impounding of American property in Cuba, which caused the US to
sponsor the Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961. This was a failed attempt at destroying
the perceived military threat, following which the US vowed not to commit any further
military invasions of Cuba. In October 1962, US intelligence discovered several USSR
missile construction sites including medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic nuclear
missiles (MRBMs and IRBMs) on Cuban soil, thus beginning the Cuban Missile Crisis. US
President Kennedy summoned the Executive Committee of the National Security Council
to advise and consider options to resolve the crisis. The options put forward by the various
political and military decision makers included an air strike to destroy the missiles, a naval
blockade of USSR military ships to Cuba, and, more passively, a stern warning to Cuba
and USSR. On the other hand, the USSR DM Premier Nikita Kruschev had to consider the
options of withdrawing missiles from Cuba or escalating the crisis by attacking US naval
blockades, bombing in-range US targets from Cuba, and initiating an Intercontinental
Ballistic Missile (ICBM) attack on the US. The options chosen by both DMs demonstrate
an e↵ort to promote the diplomatic channel, as the US chose to blockade USSR military
supplies to Cuba while the USSR chose to withdraw the nuclear missiles. On November
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20, 1962, with the end of the US naval blockade of Cuba, the Cuban Missile Crisis was
finally over.
6.7.2 Modeling the Cuban Missile Crisis
DMs and Options
There are 2 main DMs in the Cuban Missile Crisis, the US and the USSR, as seen in the
left-hand column of Table 6.2. Cuba is not modeled as a DM since it does not control any
options over the US or the USSR and is not significant to the conflict. The DMs control
two options each; the US controls the option of 1) conducting an air strike (Air Strike)
on Cuba and 2) applying a naval blockade of USSR military ships to Cuba (Blockade).
The USSR controls the option of 1) withdrawing missiles from Cuba (Withdraw) and 2)
escalating the crisis (Escalate). The same modeling is applied for the crisis studied by
Fraser and Hipel (Fraser and Hipel, 1984) using conflict analysis. Throughout the chapter,
all screen-shots were taken for this specific conflict. Defining DMs and options is done in
the first screen as shown in Figure 6.5.
Infeasible states and Irreversible Moves
Through the various combinations of all options for both DMs, there are a total of 16
possible states; however, 4 states are infeasible where a DM chooses contradictory options.
For example, there are no states where the USSR chooses both to Withdraw and to Es-
calate. Figure 6.6 shows how this step can be implemented in GMCR+. The result is 12
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feasible states as shown in the 12 columns of Table 6.2, with ‘Y’ denoting ‘yes’ indicating
an option is taken and ‘N’ denoting ‘No’ indicating an option is not taken. Notice that at
state 7, the US chooses not to conduct an air strike but instead applies a naval blockade
to Cuba. Also in state 7, the USSR chooses the option of withdrawing missiles and not
escalating the crisis. Historically, this was the actual resolution to the crisis (i.e. the final
equilibrium of the conflict). For feasible states, a DM can choose to cause a unilateral
transition between states by changing the option choice except if the option is irreversible
like the option of an Air Strike by the US as illustrated in Figure 6.7.
Table 6.2: DMs, Options and Stated for the Cuban Missile Crisis
DMs and options States
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
US
1. Air Strike N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y
2. Blockade N N Y Y N N Y Y N N Y Y
USSR
3. Withdraw N N N N Y Y Y Y N N N N
4. Escalate N N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y
Preferences
In order to rank states for a DM, one can directly rank the states using pairwise comparisons
of feasible states. However, this process can be inaccurate and lengthy. Hence, an e cient
process is necessary.
Table 6.3 demonstrates preference statements for the US in the Cuban Missile Crisis.
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These preference statements are used to rank the states based on the algorithms described
in Section 6.3.2. For example, the preference statement with the highest ranking, statement
#1, means that the US would most prefer the USSR to just withdraw their missiles from
Cuba. The seventh US preference statement means that the US prefers an air strike or
a blockade if the USSR does not withdraw and does not escalate. Figure 6.8 shows how
to input these statements into GMCR+. Through algorithms in GMCR+, the preference
statements are automatically converted to states rankings.
Table 6.3: US Preference Statements
P# Preference Statements 
(From most to least important) 
GMCR+ Implementation 
(Using friendly toggle buttons) 
1 USSR to withdraw missiles from Cuba – – Y – 
2 USSR not to escalate – – – N 
3 US doesn’t air strike and USSR 
withdraw missiles N – Y – 
4 US doesn’t carry a blockade and USSR 
withdraw missiles 
– N Y – 
5 US air strike and USSR escalates Y – – Y 
6 US carry a blockade and USSR escalates – Y – Y 
7 US air strike or carry a blockade if USSR 
doesn’t withdraw & escalates 
– Y – N /  – Y N – /  
 Y – – N /  Y – N – 
8 US doesn’t air strike if USSR doesn’t 
withdraw & escalates 
N – N N 
9 US doesn’t carry a blockade if USSR 
doesn’t withdraw & escalates 
– N N N 
   !
Equilibria Results and Insights
The equilibria results screen depicted in Figure 6.4 shows that states 5, 6, and 7 are the
strongest equilibria for this conflict model. State 7 was historically the final resolution of
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the conflict. Launching the visualizer at the bottom of the screen reveals both tree diagram
and the graph model of the conflict depicted in Figures 6.11 and 6.13. Note that solid lines
indicate the US while dashed lines indicate the USSR.
Using the post analysis screen, one can see that state 7 is reachable from the status
quo state 1 and is reachable solely by UIs. Furthermore, the analyst may wish to carry
out some sensitivity analysis using the Inverse GMCR screen as shown in Figure 6.10.
6.8 Case Study 2: The Elmira Conflict
6.8.1 Background
In late 1989, a controversy surfaced in the small town of Elmira, located north of the cities
of Kitchener and Waterloo in southwestern Ontario, Canada. With a population of about
12,000 residents, Elmira is known for its agriculture and various industries, including a
pesticide and rubber manufacturer, Uniroyal Chemical Ltd (UR). The municipal water
supply of the town was formerly obtained from an underground aquifer, until the Ontario
Ministry of Environment (MoE) uncovered that this fresh water supply was polluted with
a carcinogen chemical, N-nitroso dimethylamine or NDMA.
Local residents, the Regional Municipality of Waterloo, and the Township of Woolwich
(LG) collectively suspected UR to have caused the pollution, citing a long history of envi-
ronmental problems and NDMA being a by-product of their manufacturing. Subsequently,
the MoE issued a Control Order (CO) under the Environment Protection Act of Ontario,
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which required UR to, among other things, execute the necessary cleanup under the su-
pervision of the MoE. Soon after, as per the Environment Protection Act, UR exercised
its right to appeal the CO which allowed a hearing to decide whether the CO should be
enforced, a modified version be proposed, or whether it should be dismissed.
The MoE encouraged the LG to take a position in the dispute and hire independent
consultants for legal and technical advice, which cost substantial sums of money. As
negotiations were underway, in August 1991, K.W. Hipel, D.M. Kilgour, and L. Fang
conducted the first conflict study of the Elmira dispute with Domain Expert Murray Haight
(Inohara and Hipel, 2008a). The conflict modeling and analysis assessed how the three DMs
could negotiate a resolution with their independent goals to a) honor the CO for the MoE,
b) modify or fully lift the CO for UR, and c) protect the health of the citizens and save its
economic base for the LG.
This work is founded upon two paper written by Kinsara et al. (2014a,b).
6.8.2 Modeling and Analysis Using Standard GMCR
The graph model for this conflict was established by Hipel et al. (1993) containing three
DMs: MoE, UR, and LG. MoE can control a single option of modifying the CO, making
it more acceptable to UR (Modify). UR has three options: to delay the appeal process
(Delay), to accept the CO whether modified or not (Accept), or to abandon the Elmira
operations (Abandon). LG has one option of insisting the original CO be applied (Insist).
Table 6.4 outlines the DMs, their options, and the 12 feasible states for the conflict. In
the table, ‘Y’ denotes ‘Yes’ meaning that option in the corresponding row is taken while
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‘N’ denotes ‘No’ indicating that the option is not taken. States 5,6,11, and 12 are shaded
indicating that UR abandons its operations in Elmira and thus ending the conflict.
Table 6.4: DMs, Options, and States for the Elmira Conflict
DM State # 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
MoE Modify N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y 
UR 
Delay Y Y N N N N Y Y N N N N 
Accept N N Y Y N N N N Y Y N N 
Abandon N N N N Y Y N N N N Y Y 
LG Insist N N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y 
According to the aforementioned background, the analysts derived the preference rank-
ings represented in Table 6.5 (Hipel et al., 1993). The preferences are ordered from the
most preferred states on the left to the least preferred states on the right. Equally preferred
states are shaded. Consequently, the standard GMCR produced the equilibria results out-
lined in Table 6.6.
Table 6.5: Preferences from Most to Least Preferred States for the Elmira Conflict
DM Most Preferred    Least Preferred 
MoE 9 3 4 10 7 1 2 8 5 6 11 12 
UR 1 4 10 7 5 6 11 12 2 3 9 8 
LG 9 3 7 1 10 8 4 2 5 6 11 12 
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Table 6.6: Equilibria Results for the Elmira Conflict
State # 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Nash     9 9 9   9 9 9 
SEQ     9 9 9   9 9 9 
GMR 9   9 9 9 9   9 9 9 
SMR 9   9 9 9 9   9 9 9 
Finally, the evolution of the Elmira conflict is illustrated in Table 6.7. While the original
analysis suggested that the conflict would be deadlocked in equilibrium state 7, on October
7, 1991, MoE and UR announced an agreement to modify the CO, making state 10 the
final equilibrium (Inohara and Hipel, 2008a). With the lack of unilateral improvements
by MoE and UR from state 7 to state 10, the authors then investigated a novel area of
coalition analysis within GMCR to explain the equilibrium jump from state 7 to state 10.
A new insight and explanation is provided to the dramatic resolution using Inverse GMCR.
Table 6.7: The Evolution of the Elmira Conflict
DM State # 1  7  10 
MoE Modify N  N Æ Y 
UR 
Delay Y  Y Æ N 
Accept N  N Æ Y 
Abandon N  N  N 
LG Insist N Æ Y  Y 
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6.8.3 Analysis Using Inverse GMCR
The aforementioned background and discussion clearly suggest that state 7 is not a desired
resolution to the conflict. Although what happened initially was in agreement with the
original analysis suggesting the conflict will be deadlocked in equilibrium state 7, it can
be anticipated that it is infeasible for UR to delay forever. Since standard GMCR deals
only with static analysis, it was not easy to foresee how the conflict can evolve. However,
from the perspective of Inverse GMCR, the analyst can understand how specific situations
may evolve. Using the goals feature of the new GMCR+, analyst can set state 10 to be an
equilibrium, and state 7 to be unstable.
Integrated graph models are illustrated in Figures 6.15 and 6.16. Each state is repre-
sented by a circled number. Each line represents a move by a specific DM. For example,
LG has a move from state 1 to state 7 and vice-versa. The move from state 1 to state 7
by LG is a UI because there are double arrows pointing to state 7.
UIs are distinguished by thick lines. Figure 6.15 depicts the original integrated graph
model of the Elmira conflict. As seen, there are no possible UIs from state 7, making it a
deadlock equilibrium. On the other hand, Figure 6.16 depicts a modified integrated graph
after using Inverse GMCR goals. State 7 now has a new UI from state 7 to state 8 by
MoE, breaking it from the original equilibrium.
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Figure 6.15: Integrated Graph Model of the Elmira Conflict (Original Model)
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Figure 6.16: Integrated Graph Model of the Elmira Conflict (New Model)
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Although state 7 can be made unstable using coalitions, as was later investigated,
generating all scenarios including coalitions gives better understanding to the conflict.
Coalition analysis shows that both MoE and UR have to cooperate to make an equilibrium
jump to a mutually preferred state. However, Inverse GMCR explanation allows each DM
to make UIs without having to cooperate. Although it is not clear how the agreement on
October of 1991 was achieved, it is very possible that negotiation between MoE and UR
in which MoE suggested its modification to the CO in order for UR to accept it. Inverse
GMCR proves to be a very valuable negotiation tool that provides analyst and mediators
with vital information to reach a desired resolution. Table 6.8 illustrates the evolution of
the conflict as explained by Inverse GMCR.
Understanding the dynamics is a vital element in conflict modeling and analysis. Inverse
GMCR is a valuable negotiation tool that explains how a state can or cannot be achieved.
The Elmira dispute is a suitable environmental conflict that illustrates the advantage of
using a variety of conflict modeling approaches, standard GMCR, coalition analysis, and
Inverse GMCR, to achieve a sustainable equilibrium. Applying these approaches provides
deeper insights and comprehensive understanding about the conflict at hand.
Table 6.8: The Evolution of the Elmira Conflict Using Invese GMCR
DM State # 1  7  8  10 
MoE Modify N  N Æ Y  Y 
UR 
Delay Y  Y  Y Æ N 
Accept N  N  N Æ Y 
Abandon N  N  N  N 
LG Insist N Æ Y  Y  Y 
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6.9 Summary of Features
A summary of GMCR+ features with a comparison of di↵erent DSSs tailored for GMCR
is illustrated in Table 6.9. It is evident that GMCR+ is richer than all of its predecessors
and superior in performance.
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Table 6.9: Comparison of di↵erent DSSs capabilities
  GMCR I (or GMCA) GMCR II GMCR+ 
O
ve
ra
ll 
C
ap
ab
ili
ti
es
 
Year of 
Development 1990 1999 2014 
Environment Windows Windows Universal (Windows, Mac, Linux) 
Programming 
Language C Language C Language Python and JavaScript 
Results Plain Text Table Various reporting styles  
(Graphs, tables, and insightful text) 
Maximum # of 
States 
200 for two-player 
models and 100 for 
multi-player models 
600 Unlimited 
Solution Concepts Nash, GMR, SMR, 
SEQ 
Nash, GMR, 
SMR, SEQ 
Nash, GMR, SMR, SEQ, 
SIM 
User Friendly 
(System-User 
Interaction) 
! 
(Requires ASCII input file in 
a required format) 
" " 
In
pu
t C
ap
ab
ili
ti
es
 
Option Form ! " " 
Preferences 
Prioritization Input !! "! " 
Graphical User 
Interface ! " " 
Infeasible States 
Removal !! " " 
Handles 
Reversibility !! " "!
Handles Intransitive 
Preferences ! ! " 
O
ut
pu
t C
ap
ab
ili
ti
es
 
Stability 
Explanation !! !! "!
Categorization of 
Equilibria !! !! "!
Interactive Status 
Quo Analysis !! !! "!
Graph Drawing !! !! "!
Interactive Graphs !! !! "!
Advanced Coalition 
Analysis !! !! "!
In
ve
rs
e 
G
M
C
R
 Inverse GMCR 
Capability !! !! "!
Post Analysis 
Capabilities !! !! "!
Scenario/Strategy 
Suggestion !! !! "!
D
es
ig
n Modular Design 
(Expandable to add 
new advancements) 
!! !! "!
!
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6.9.1 Overall review
In summary, three essential elements constitute the GMCR+ DSS: the structure of the
model (conflict specifications), conflict data processors, and display components (GUI).
The conflict specification is built on a structured set of objects (options, DMs, condi-
tions, etc.) with defined properties and interactions that exist within a conflict model as
outlined in Section 6.2.
The “conflict data processors” as explained in Sections 6.3 and 6.4 constitute the so-
lution engines. GMCR+ has 4 distinct and independent “solvers”: the logical solver, the
matrix solver, the inverse solver, and the goal seeker.
The GUI is the component which the user actually interacts with. The purpose of the
GUI is to control the flow of all parts of the program. It is organized into screens, of which
there are eight so far (more can be easily added). Each of these screens is composed of a
series of smaller elements that display and/or control some elements of either the conflict
model or one of the solution engines. These elements are reusable on multiple screens,
as appropriate. When a user launches the program, the basic parts of the user interface
are constructed, then an empty conflict model is formulated. GMCR+ then initializes all
the parts of the interface that are meant to contain and/or control conflict information
by building those elements and giving them references to the part of the conflict model
they are meant to represent. When a user interacts with a part of the interface, it sends
a message to the conflict model and the requested change is executed. This change is
then reflected in all other elements of the interface that hold references to that part of the
conflict model.
136
When a user navigates to one of the result screens (Equilibria Results, Inverse GMCR,
or Post Analysis), GMCR+ creates an instance of one of the solvers, giving it a reference
to the current conflict model. The solver does the work of interpreting the conflict model
and generating results. The interface elements of the screen (some of which communicate
with the conflict model, some with the solver, while others communicate to both) display
the results generated. Moreover, GMCR+ allows the user to request additional analysis
from the solver, the results of which are returned to the appropriate user interface element.
Figure 6.17 illustrates the di↵erent elements of GMCR+ and their interactions. More-
over, the figure depicts the modular design of GMCR+ and how new extensions can be
integrated.
6.9.2 Complexity
Algorithms are commonly measured for computational complexity in order to determine
time and memory requirements as a function of the input, and are commonly expressed us-
ing the O-notation (Papadimitriou, 2003). Complexity class is based on the mathematical
logic required. Complex computations are classified as Non-deterministic Polynomial-time
hard or NP-hard which is “at least as hard as the hardest problems in NP”. (Bovet et al.,
1994). Less complex operations are classified as polynomial. The primary operation in
GMCR+ is a simple comparison, which has a complexity of O(m), where m refers to the
number of feasible states in the conflict model. However, the comparison operation is per-
formed on the reachability matrix which has a size of m ⇥m. Therefore, initializing the
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matrix has a complexity of O(m2). Using the improved method of Peng (1999), populating
the reachability matrix has a worst-case complexity of O(22m/n) where n denotes the num-
ber of DMs. This level of complexity was achieved in GMCR II by limiting the scope of
the search to only possible moves among states controlled by each DM instead of looping
through all feasible states (Peng, 1999).
The number of permutations for calculating Inverse GMCR using brute-force is given
by (m!)n as mentioned in Section 5.2.5, making the complexity of this implementation
O(m!). This can harm the system performance especially when large models are used.
However, the improved approach based on the definitions stated in Section 5.2 reduces the
complexity to less than O(m2).
Memory issues may arise as the core of any conflict model within GMCR+ is based
on a dense reachability matrix. The full reachability matrix with size m⇥m is created in
memory. The observed limit is around 20,000 states using a computer with 4GB of RAM,
and reflects the memory required to hold the reachability matrix. Most real-world models
in the literature contain fewer than 1,000 states, making GMCR+ su cient. Moving to
dynamically generated reachabilities could eliminate this constraint for conflicts having
more than 20,000 states, and might be an important future project .
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6.10 Chapter Summary
The framework, modules, and algorithms used within the newly developed DSS, GMCR+,
are presented in this chapter. GMCR+ allows the analyst to be accurate, e cient, and
insightful in modeling and analyzing strategic conflicts. The presentation and visualization
components of GMCR+ provide a superior platform for communicating conflict dynamics
and results. Strategic insights are derived from the rich, easy-to-manipulate post-analysis
tools within the system. Finally, flexibility and modularity make the system adaptable and
open for future theoretical developments in the field of conflict resolution and the graph
model. Key highlights of the GMCR+ system include the following:
1. GMCR+ is a comprehensive DSS that has been built from scratch to overcome
previous DSS limitations and provide additional features.
2. GMCR+ uses Python and Javascript programming languages, allowing it to be a
universal software.
3. All features from GMCR II are included in GMCR+, in addition to many new fea-
tures including:
(a) Stability explanation
(b) Categorization of equilibria
(c) Interactive graphs and status quo analysis
(d) Advanced coalition analysis
(e) Post analysis capabilities
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4. GMCR+ includes Inverse GMCR capabilities to facilitate negotiation modeling, in
addition to other post analysis features.
5. GMCR+ has four distinct and independent “solvers”: the logical solver, the matrix
solver, the inverse solver, and the goal seeker.
6. The modular design of GMCR+ facilitates the addition of new graph model algo-
rithms.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Work
Complicated strategic conflicts require deep analysis for understanding and for drawing
strategic insights. In a complex conflict, a definitive prediction is highly unlikely, as pre-
dictions tend to be inaccurate, especially in a dynamic world. Inverse GMCR provides
strategic information and generates important scenarios that can aid analysts, mediators,
or disputants to make wise decisions to achieve more desired resolutions. It is evident that
decision support is vital in resolving modern strategic conflicts especially when thousands
of scenarios must be examined and countless computations performed. The development of
GMCR+ facilitates numerous insights into a conflict, including scenario generation, graph
model drawing, status quo analysis, and coalition analysis, to name a few. Coupling a
strategic methodology like Inverse GMCR with a powerful DSS like GMCR+ results in a
practical framework that is widely accessible to researchers and can be applied to many
modern strategic conflicts.
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The application of standard GMCR methodology is limited by the requirement of an
accurate preference ranking for all DMs involved in a conflict. Despite various attempts
to simplify preference input, there is no appropriate methodology to solve and avoid the
preference requirement. The methodology presented in this thesis has resolved this predica-
ment. Inverse GMCR does not require preference ranking input in the modeling stage. In
fact, the results of Inverse GMCR include the preference structure required to achieve or
avoid a specific outcome.
7.1 Research Contributions
The main contributions of this research are summarized in the following points:
1. Negotiation and third party intervention are formally modeled by the development
of the Inverse GMCR framework.
2. New stability definitions are crafted for Inverse GMCR and mathematical represen-
tations are formulated.
(a) The new concepts of preference profiles and preference structures are introduced.
Formal mathematical representations for both concepts are provided.
(b) The four basic solution concepts from standard GMCR: Nash, GMR, SMR, and
SEQ are redefined for Inverse GMCR as Nash IPS, GMR IPS, SMR IPS, and
SEQ IPS, respectively.
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3. A comprehensive DSS with advanced reporting features, GMCR+, is designed, built,
and illustrated in Chapter 6.
(a) GMCR+ was built from scratch to handle standard GMCR analysis as the root
of its analysis engine. It has all the relevant capabilities of its predecessor,
GMCR II, with additional features and functionality including:
i. Intransitive preference handling.
ii. Individual stability explanation.
iii. Categorization of equilibria by option selection and sorting feature.
iv. Interactive graphs with UI di↵erentiation.
v. Multi-level tree diagrams with interactive status quo analysis.
vi. Advanced coalition analysis with graphing feature.
vii. Post-analysis and goal-seeking capabilities.
(b) Conflict specification within GMCR+ branches into objects and attributes. The
root of any conflict model is the option object(s). Other objects within GMCR+
include condition objects, DM objects, and coalition objects. Each object con-
tains all of the defining attributes.
(c) Data processing and algorithms used within GMCR+ are discussed and illus-
trated using pseudocodes and examples.
(d) GMCR+ has four analysis engines, referred to as ‘solvers’, that address di↵erent
types of problems. The logical solver is derived from the basic definitions of the
standard GMCR methodology. The matrix solver is a computational enhance-
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ment to the logical solver proposed by Xu et al. (2007). The inverse solver and
the goal seeker are both based on the new Inverse GMCR methodology given
in this research.
4. The methodology introduced and the new DSS, GMCR+, were applied to a wide
range of real world conflicts including a complex water conflict along the Euphrates
River in the Middle East, an environmental conflict in Elmira, Ontario, Canada, and
the international Cuban Missile Crisis.
7.2 Future Work
Reverse engineering the GMCR methodology for simple preferences using Inverse GMCR
is the first step towards negotiation modeling within the framework of GMCR. Many
recent and ongoing expansions within the GMCR structure may be integrated with the
new Inverse GMCR methodology. Research opportunities that can be considered for future
studies are as follows:
1. Research on preference approaches within the framework of GMCR can be incor-
porated into the new Inverse GMCR methodology. These approaches include the
research on strength of preferences (Hamouda et al., 2004, 2006), preferences uncer-
tainty (Li et al., 2004a), fuzzy preferences (Bashar et al., 2012; Hipel et al., 2011)
and grey-based preferences (Kuang et al., 2013).
2. Determining a target equilibrium state could be a challenging task, especially in
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complex conflicts. A methodology to advise mediators on possibilities for a target
state may be an important project.
3. In the standard graph model, multiple equilibria may cause uncertainty. Coalition
analysis (Kilgour et al., 2001) can be used to reduce the number of possible equilibria.
Status-quo analysis (Li et al., 2004b) may show that an equilibrium is unreachable, in
theory or in practice. Additional research is needed to integrate these methodologies
within Inverse GMCR.
4. Research on misperceptions (Wang et al., 1988; Fraser et al., 1990) can be investigated
and possibly incorporated into the standard GMCR. Further research could integrate
misperceptions with Inverse GMCR.
5. Various third party roles and strategies are investigated and presented in Chapter 2
of this thesis. A methodology is needed to advise a mediator on the best role and
strategy to undertake in any particular conflict situation.
6. There are recent and ongoing expansions of the GMCR methodology which can
be conveniently incorporated into GMCR+ due to its modular design. A research
project to incorporate these advancements would enhance the GMCR+ system.
These expansions include:
• Strength of preference (Hamouda et al., 2004, 2006).
• Uncertain preferences (Li et al., 2004a).
• Fuzzy preferences (Bashar et al., 2012; Hipel et al., 2011).
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• Grey-Based preferences (Kuang et al., 2013).
• Policy stability (Zeng et al., 2004).
• Attitudes (Walker et al., 2008).
• Hypergames (Bennett, 1980; Wang et al., 1988).
7. GMCR+ uses a dense reachability matrix, which is created in memory. This creates a
memory restriction limiting the models that can be analyzed by the available RAM.
Moving to dynamically generated reachabilities could eliminate this restriction to
analyze larger conflict models.
8. Although GMCR+ can theoretically handle intransitive preferences, there has not
been an adequate way to represent them graphically in the user interface (GUI).
Therefore, the design of a suitable representation for intransitive preferences may be
an important future project.
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A Simple Guide to GMCR+1 1 Holders of GMCR+ copyright are
Rami A. Kinsara, Oskar Petersons,
Keith W. Hipel, and D. Marc KilgourBy Rami A. Kinsara
Last Updated: October 15, 2014
This document is intended as a short and simple guide to using
GMCR+. Although GMCR+ was built to be intuitive and user-friendly,
this guide aims at maximizing the benefits from this advanced decision
support system. The approach in designing this guide is to be succinct
by maximizing illustrations and avoiding unnecessary details. Since
Microsoft Windows® is the most common operating system, it will be
used for explanation purposes. However, the illustrations shown can be
navigated on other operating systems as well.
1 Installation
You can download GMCR+ from its official website. Simply navi-
gate to the URL: http://www.gmcrplus.com and click Download on
the main page. After downloading the installation package, simply
double click the installation file. You will face a typical installation
welcome screen where you can modify the default installation path.
Clicking next will install GMCR+ and you are all done.
Installation Path
You are done!
Figure 1: Installation Wizard Windows.
Notice that this process requires only two
simple clicks
Figure 2: You will find a link to
GMCR+ on your desktop
After installation is completed, you will find a shortcut icon on
your desktop as shown in Figure 2.
2 Starting GMCR+ and the Main Screen
Double clicking the GMCR+ icon (Figure 2) will start GMCR+ and a
new conflict model is loaded as shown in Figure 3.
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Figure 3: Main GMCR+ Screen.
2. Navigation Bar1. Utility Buttons
3. Reference & Info
Figure 4: Standard Utility Buttons.
The main screen is divided into four main areas. At the top left
of the screen, the user can find standard utility buttons to load, save,
and create new conflict models (Figure 4). The top of the screen
contains a large navigation bar (Figure 5). This bar displays each of
the logical steps in the modeling of a conflict, and allows the user to
easily move between them. The active stage button is colored while
the other buttons are dimmed.
Figure 5: Main Navigation Bar. Notice
that each modeling step is referred to as
button in the main navigation bar
Along the right edge of the screen, a column provides a quick
reference about how to use the interface for the current stage of the
modeling process (Figure 6). The remainder of the screen is used
to display and edit information related to the active stage of the
modeling process.
Figure 6: Quick Reference and Info
Area.
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3 Modeling Conflicts with GMCR+
For the sake of making this guide practical, an actual conflict will be
analyzed in the process of explaining the functions of GMCR+. The
conflict that took place in 1975 between Syria and Iraq over the Eu-
phrates River will be analyzed. For a detailed historical background
and analysis for this conflict and other related conflicts along the
Euphrates, please refer to the work done by Hipel et al. 2. 2 Keith W Hipel, D Marc Kilgour, and
Rami A Kinsara. Strategic investigations
of water conflicts in the middle east.
Group Decision and Negotiation, 23(3):
355–376, 2014
3.1 Inputting DMs and Options
Make sure you are located in the DMs & Options screen by clicking
on its button (Figure 7). The DMs and options for the Syria-Iraq
conflict are given in Table 1.
Figure 7: DMs & Options Button.
TABLE I. DMS AND OPTIONS
DM Option  Description
Syria 1. Release
Water
Y Syria agrees to halt the filling of
Thawra Dam and let the Euphrates
flow into Iraq
N Syria continues to fill its dam
2. Escalate Y This could be done by cutting relations
with Iraq, sending troops to the shared
border, closing the air space to Iraqi
aircraft, or any combination of these
actions
N Syria does not undertake any of the
escalating options
Iraq 3. Attack Y This includes bombing of the dam and
going to war with Syria
N Iraq does not act and accepts the
situation
Table 1: DMs, options and descriptions
for the Syria-Iraq conflict. For when an
option is taken (Y for yes) or not selected (N
for no)
Start adding Syria as a DM by double clicking on “Double Click to
Add an Item" at the left of the screen (Figure 8a). Once you double
click, the middle screen becomes active and you can type the DM’s
name (Figure 8b). New Option button allows you to add options to
the active DM. As you can see, the two options of Release Water and
Escalate for Syria have been added. Do the same for DM Iraq.
(a) (b)
Figure 8: (a) Adding DMs. (b) Editing
DM’s Name and Adding Options.
After inputting all DMs and options, you can see the full list of
DMs in the conflict to the left of the screen. Clicking on a DM’s name
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will select it and display the DM’s associated options in a list to the
right. While a DM or option is selected, it can be deleted, or its name
can be modified. Buttons at the bottom of the screen allow the order
of DMs to be changed or a DM deleted (Figure 9). The information
panel at the right edge of the screen displays the number of DMs
already defined, the options, and the total number of states that
would be in the game if no infeasible states were removed.
Arrange DMs
Figure 9: Buttons for Arranging and
Deleting DMs.3.2 Removing Infeasible States
After defining DMs and options, GMCR+ will generate a list of all
possible states. There are usually infeasible states that must be re-
moved from the conflict model. In order to do that, navigate to the
Infeasible States screen (Figure 10).
Figure 10: Infeasible States Button.
Figure 11: Infeasible States Removal
Screen.
The panel to the left (Frame 1 in Figure 11) contains a set of toggle
buttons where option selections can be made to specify an infeasible
condition. Clicking “Remove as Infeasible Condition" will remove all
states satisfying this condition from the conflict model and display
the infeasible condition along with the number of removed states in
the middle of the screen (Frame 2 in Figure 11). Clicking “Remove as
Mutually Exclusive Options" generates a list of conditions prohibit-
ing any states where two or more of the chosen option selections are
taken. In the Syria-Iraq conflict, there is one infeasible situation in
which Syria both releases the water and escalates the situation at the
same time (mutually exclusive options). Inputting this pattern gener-
ates two infeasible conditions as shown in Figure 11. The remaining
feasible states can be viewed in different formats as illustrated in
Frame 3 of Figure 11. The set of feasible states can be displayed either
as a list of feasible conditions, as a full list of feasible states in YN
format, or as ordered and decimal state numbers. Finally, Frame 4 of
Figure 11 is an informational panel displaying the original number of
states in the conflict, the number of states removed, and the number
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of feasible states remaining. Below is a brief set of instructions for
using the Infeasible States screen.
3.3 Specifying Irreversible Moves
In order to specify the reversibility of options, navigate to the Irre-
versible Moves screen (Figure 12).
Figure 12: Irreversible Moves Button.
By default, all options in the conflict are displayed with a two-
headed arrow pointing between ‘Y’ and ‘N’ denoting that all moves
are reversible (Figure 13). Clicking the arrow toggles the direction
of reversibility. This way, the user or analyst can leave the option as
reversible, or define the direction of irreversibility. For the case of
Syria-Iraq conflict, all moves are assumed to be reversible.
Figure 13: Irreversible Moves Screen.
3.4 Inputting Preferences Using Option Prioritization
Preferences for DMs can be specified through preferred conditions
or through direct ranking of states. The preferred conditions method
allows you to define preference prioritization conditions to make the
ranking of states easier and more intuitive. Direct ranking, on the
other hand, allows you to fine tune the results from prioritization
or assumes that you are certain about the ranking of states for each
DM. In order to input preferences using prioritization, navigate to the
Prioritization screen (Figure 14).
Table 4. Preference prioritization information for the 1975 conflict without the Third Party. 
DM P# Preference Information 
(From most to least important) Further Explanation 
Syria 1 Remain at the status quo Syria continues filling its dam and Iraq 
accepts the situation without any escalation or 
intervention 
 2 Escalate the situation if Iraq 
decides to attack 
Syria next prefers going to war with Iraq if it 
is attacked, which is more preferred than 
releasing water 
Iraq 1 Syria releases more flow of 
the Euphrates River 
Iraq most prefers the situation in which Syria 
stops filling its dam without any escalation 
 2 Execute an attack if Syria 
does not release more water 
Iraq’s interest in water far outweighs the 
consequence of going to war  
    
 
  
Table 2: Preference Prioritization
Information for the Syria-Iraq Conflict.
Figure 14: Prioritization Button.
The panel to the left of the Prioritization screen contains all DMs
and their corresponding preference rankings as shown in Frame 1
of Figure 15 is a table with all . Clicking Edit next to any DM will
change its color to green and allow the preferences for that DM to be
modified. A user can click “Done" to clear the DM selection. Frame
2 of Figure 15 includes toggle buttons for all DMs and their options.
In order to add a preferred condition, simply make option selec-
tions (current toggle selection is shown in ‘YN’ format at the bottom
bar Balloon A of Frame 2). Then, you can either add them directly
as a preferred condition (Frame 4) or move them to a staging area
(Frame 3) where multiple conditions can be added together with
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Figure 15: Prioritization Screen.
equal weight. Moreover, you can add conditions using logical state-
ments via the input bar at the bottom of Frame 2 as shown in Balloon
B. IF and IFF logical statements are allowed to speed the preferences
input process. Simply type if or iff between the option numbers (pos-
itive for Y) and (negative for N), see below.
Table 2 presents the preference prioritization information for each
DM in the Syria-Iraq conflict. The first preference statement for Syria
is to remain at the status quo. Therefore, you should choose ‘N’
across all options to indicate the status quo, then you simply click
“Add as Preferred State". The second statement for Syria is to Escalate
if DM Iraq Attacks. This information is entered using the logical
statement input bar by typing "2 if 3" then you can add it directly
as a preferred state. Suppose the statement was Don’t release water
if Iraq attacks, then the logical statement would be "-1 if 3" and so
on. If the syntax entered is invalid, you will receive an error message
next to the input bar.
Frame 4 of Figure 15 displays the preferred conditions for the
selected DM and the weights associated with those conditions. Frame
5 displays a prompt ensuring preferences are valid and below that is
a quick reference guide for using the Prioritization screen. Finally, a
large table displaying the conflict in option form occupies the bottom
of the screen as shown in Frame 6 of Figure 15. A pink indicator
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follows the mouse to highlight the selected row and column. The
states are ordered according to their ranking for the active DM. The
table also displays the ordinal payoff value of each state according to
the active DM. If no DM is selected, the states are ordered based on
state number and payoff values for all DMs will be shown.
3.5 Inputting Preferences Using Preference Ranking
In order to fine tune or input preferences information directly, navi-
gate to the Preference Ranking screen (Figure 16). At the top of Frame
1 in Figure 17 is a large button entitled “Press to enable manual pref-
erence ranking changes" which allows you to enable the screen when
clicked. Then you can start modifying the preference rankings shown
for the DMs in the fields below (Balloon (B) of Frame 1 in Figure 17).
States are listed using their ordered numbers, and equally preferred
states can be indicated by enclosing them in square brackets. In the
middle of the screen (Balloon C of Frame 1), a large text box displays
feedback on the validity of the entered preference rankings. Each
preference ranking must contain each state once and only once to be
considered valid. At the bottom of the screen (Balloon D of Frame 1),
an option form table for the conflict is shown, similar to that on the
Preference Prioritization screen. If you wish to revert to the preferences
of the Preference Prioritization screen, you can return to the Preference
Prioritization screen and click the large button that appears at the top
of the screen.
Figure 16: Preference Ranking Button.
Figure 17: Preference Ranking Screen.
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Table 5. Ranking of states for the DMs in the 1975 conflict without the Third Party. 
DM  States 
Syria 1 3 6 2 4 5 
       
Iraq 2 4 6 1 5 3 
 Most 
Preferred 
 Least 
Preferred 
 
  
Table 3: Ranking of States for the DMs
in the Syria-Iraq Conflict.
Table 3 presents the ranking of states for the Syria-Iraq conflict
from most to least preferred for both DMs. This information can
be easily entered into the input bars corresponding to each DM. For
Syria enter [1, 3, 6, 2, 4, 5] and for Iraq enter [2, 4, 6, 1, 5, 3].
At this point, make sure you have saved the conflict model using
the standard save button (Figure 4). Now that you have a graph
model, we will guide you through the analysis functionality of
GMCR+ in the next section.
4 Analyzing Conflicts with GMCR+
In this section, the different analyses and output representation capa-
bilities of GMCR+ are illustrated.
4.1 Equilibria Results and Visualizer
In order to display equilibria results, navigate to the Equilibria Results
screen (Figure 18). The top of Frame 1 in Figure 19 shows the option
form table for the conflict. Below that you can see equilibria calcu-
lation results for all states and solution concepts. You can filter the
results, which is handy in large conflicts, using the toggle buttons
(Balloon B of Frame 1). Results can also be ordered according to each
DM’s preferences. You examine the equilibria for coalitions by merg-
ing possible coalitions in square brackets in the bar to the top of the
screen (Balloon A of Frame 1). Frame 2 of Figure 19 is the narration
panel, which allows you to check for individual stability by selecting
a DM, state, and solution concept; then the process used to determine
that individual stability or instability is explained. At the bottom of
Frame 1 (Balloon C), the option to launch a visualizer will draw the
graphs in a separate screen.
Figure 18: Equilibria Results Button.
Notice that Figure 19 shows equilibria results for the Syria-Iraq
conflict and the results are sorted according to Syria’s preferences.
Click on “Launch Visualizer" to launch a web application within the
GMCR+ system allowing you to see the actual graph of the conflict
model as shown in Figure 20. The default view is a status quo anal-
ysis tree diagram. The top of the tree denotes the status quo and the
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Figure 19: Equilibria Results Screen.
Note that Nash stands for Nash stability,
GMR for general metarationality, SMR for
symmetric metarationality, and SEQ for
sequential stability. Simultaneous stability
(SIM) examines the strategic impact of two
or more DMs moving together at the same
time from a given state
Figure 20: Default Visualizer Screen.
Notice that it is the tree diagram
branches are the possible unilateral moves from that state by each
DM. Lines are color- and dash-coded for each DM. Hovering the
mouse on any state shades all circles with that state within the tree.
Hovering the mouse at the bottom of the screen (Balloon B of Figure
20) displays an option form table for the conflict model. Hovering
the mouse to the left of the screen (Balloon A of Figure 20) shows the
display options panel as shown in Figure 21. This panel allows you to
change the display method between a tree and a graph diagram (See
A in Figure 21). Switching to the graph diagram mode will show the
actual graph model for the conflict at hand as shown in Figure 22. In
the Display Options panel, Differentiating or showing UIs only can be
achieved from the Display Configuration area as shown in Balloons B
and C of Figure 21. Other configurations include adjusting the tree
depth and the shape of connections in the graph diagram. The op-
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tions shown in the area of Balloon D in Figure 21 allow you to select
a specific DM(s) to see individual graphs instead of integrated ones.
Figure 21: Display Options Panel for
Tree and Graph Diagrams
Figure 22: Conflict Model Graph
Diagram
Figure 23: Inverse GMCR Button.
4.2 Inverse GMCR
In order to perform Inverse GMCR analysis, navigate to the Inverse
GMCR screen (Figure 23). Frame 1 of Figure 24 contains the control
panel. This control panel allows you to specify a desired equilibrium
state (Balloon A). Furthermore, you can select a preference variance
range for each DM and then perform the Inverse GMCR calculations
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(Balloon B). Frame 2 explains the conditions required to achieve
the desired stability according to each solution concept. Long form
results can be displayed on the bottom of Frame 2 by selecting to
display all permutations in the control panel (Balloon C) and can be
filtered by the solution concepts check boxes (Balloon D). This is a
useful addition allowing you to perform extensive sensitivity analysis
on preferences.
Figure 24: Inverse GMCR Screen.
For the Syria-Iraq conflict, a more desired resolution would be
state 2 in which both Syria and Iraq stop escalating and water is re-
leased to Iraq. Choose state 2 as a desired equilibrium, make sure
you specify the variation range for Syria then click on “Perform In-
verse Calculations". You will see that 240 and 420 possible preference
profiles can achieve the desired resolution according to Nash and
SEQ solution concepts, respectively. In Frame 2 of Figure 24, you can
see the explanation as follows:
1. Nash Stability: if and only if Syria prefers state 2 to states 1 and
3.
2. Sequential Stability: if and only if Syria prefers state 2 to states 1
and 3. OR
(a) if Iraq prefers state 4 to state 1, then Syria must have state 4
less preferred than 2.
(b) or if Iraq prefers state 6 to state 3, then Syria must have state 6
less preferred than 2.
4.3 Post Analysis
Figure 25: Post Analysis Button.
To carry out more advanced post analysis functions, navigate to the
Post Analysis screen (Figure 25). In this screen you can specify coali-
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tions within the control panel (Balloon A in Frame 1 of Figure 26)
similar to the way illustrated in the Equilibria Results screen men-
tioned in Section 4.1. In addition, you can choose a specific state to
act as a status quo for the conflict and carry out the analysis from
it. Frame 2 will automatically show the selected state as the top of
the tree with a ‘+’ sign to expand the branch at Frame 2 in Figure 26.
Clicking the ‘+’ sign expands the branch into reachable states and UIs
are shaded green. This feature allows you to know if a possible equi-
librium is reachable from the status quo and whether it is reachable
solely by UIs. This information is also given in the narration panel to
the right of the screen (Frame 3).
Figure 26: Post Analysis Screen.
The tool highlighted in Balloon B of Frame 1 in Figure 26 is called
the Goal Seeker, which is an extensive version of the Inverse GMCR.
You can experiment with different scenarios by setting particular
states to be stable while setting other states to be unstable. Whether
these choices are possible or not is explained in Frame 3 and how
they can be achieved if possible is narrated as well. Frame 4 contains
the conflict table in option form for your convenience.
5 Highlights of GMCR+ Capabilities through Examples
In this section, you will learn about distinct GMCR+ features through
various built-in examples. GMCR+ comes with ready-made examples
that are accessible from the standard utility button “Load Game" as
shown in Figure 27. The file extension for all games modeled with
GMCR+ is .gmcr. Built-in examples include:
Figure 27: Load Utility Buttons.
• Prisoners’ Dilemma (Prisoners.gmcr).
• The Cuban Missile Crisis (Cuban.gmcr).
• The Elmira conflict (Elmira.gmcr).
• The Garrison Diversion Unit (GDU) (Garrison.gmcr).
• The Syria-Iraq conflict (used earlier in this guide) (SyriaIraq.gmcr).
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5.1 Equilibria Filtering
Load the GDU model by clicking on “Load Game" and opening
(Garrison.gmcr) file. Navigate to the Equilibria Results screen (Figure
18). The filtering feature mentioned briefly in Section 4.1 is a very
handy tool for large conflicts such as the GDU conflict 3. This con- 3 Keith W. Hipel and Niall M. Fraser.
Metagame analysis of the garrison
conflict. Water Resources Research, 16(4):
629–637, 1980. ISSN 1944-7973
flict has 23 feasible states, which may be challenging to keep track of.
But using the filtering feature, it is easy to navigate through the rel-
evant states. Assume that you are interested only in states in which
U.S. Support does not proceed to complete full GDU and that are at
least GMR stable. You can achieve this by clicking the toggle button
in front of each option (Ballon A in Figure 28). You can then sort
the results according to U.S. Support from most to least preferred by
clicking in front of its payoff (Ballon B in Figure 28).
Figure 28: GDU Equilibria Filtering.
5.2 Coalitions
The Elmira conflict 4 is an environmental case that demonstrates 4 Rami A. Kinsara, D. Marc Kilgour, and
Keith W. Hipel. The inverse approach
to conflict resolution in environmental
management. Group Decision and
Negotiation, pages 224–231, June 2014
the power of Coalitions. Load the Elmira model by clicking on “Load
Game" and opening (Elmira.gmcr) file. Navigate to the Equilibria
Results screen (Figure 18). As you can see in Figure 29, state 7 is an
equilibrium, indicating that the conflict will be deadlocked at this
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state. However, if a coalition is formed, the situation will change.
Modify the coalitions bar to be Coalitions:[1,2],3 indicating a
coalition between MoE and Uniroyal instead of the original unilateral
game with Coalitions:1,2,3 (Balloon A in Figure 30).
Figure 29: Original Elmira Equilibria.
Notice that members of the coalition are enclosed between square
brackets. If the format is incorrect, you will see a prompt Invalid Syntax
or Missing DMs in Balloon B of Figure 30. As you can see, state 7 is
no longer an equilibrium. The following section highlights the sig-
nificance of this information with the use of interactive status quo
analysis.
Figure 30: Elmira Equilibria with
Coalition.
5.3 Interactive Status Quo Analysis
GMCR+ system is equipped with two different interfaces to carry out
status quo analysis. Following up with the aforementioned Elmira
conflict; while you are in the Equilibria Results screen (Figure 30),
click on “Launch Visualizer". A web application will start loading the
tree diagram of the conflict as depicted in Figure 31. Notice that,
since the model has defined coalitions, the tree diagram treats the
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coalition as an individual Entity represented by a single line (Figure
31 has the coalition marked with a solid blue line). If you checked the
Differentiate UIs box within the Display Configuration on the left, you
can see bold lines indicating UIs. From the status quo, state 1, the
Local Government has a UI to state 7, from which the coalition, MoE
and Uniroyal, has a UI to state 10. Prior to the coalition, there were no
possible moves from state 7 to state 10.
Figure 31: Elmira Tree Diagram with
Coalition.
Another way of conducting status quo analysis is by navigating to
the Post Analysis screen (Figure 25). Click on the (+) sign as shown
by Balloon A in Figure 32 to expand the tree from the status quo,
which in this example is state 1. As you can see, there is only one
UI available, which is by the Local Government highlighted in green.
Expanding this node reveals the five possible moves from state 7, of
which only one is a UI that can be carried out by the coalition (MoE
and Uniroyal).
Figure 32: Elmira Status Quo Analysis
with Coalition.
Try removing the coalition by simply removing the square brackets
from the coalition bar as shown by Balloon B in Figure 33. Expanding
the status quo tree reveals that only one UI to state 7 is available and
no moves can be made to state 10 by any DM unilaterally.
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Figure 33: Elmira Status Quo Analysis
without Coalition.
6 Visualizer and JSON Files
An advanced feature of GMCR+ is the ability to export the Java Script
Object Notation (JSON) file of the conflict. A JSON file contains the
conflict description including DMs, options, coalitions, reachabil-
ity matrix, and ordinal payoffs. This file can be easily imported into
GMCR+ visualizer. Say you want to share or communicate a conflict
model, simply navigate to the Equilibria Results screen (Figure 18)
and click on Save Reachability as JSON (Figure 34). You can then im-
port the conflict model into any computer (even if it does not have
GMCR+ installed) by opening your web browser and navigating to
the URL: http://gmcr.rkinsara.com. Once you open this URL, you
will see a GMCR Conflict Visualizer web application with a default
tree diagram of the Prisoners’ Dilemma game. Hovering the mouse to
the left of the screen (Balloon A of Figure 36) will reveal the Display
Options panel where you can click the Choose File button to import the
JSON file as shown in Figure 35.
Figure 34: Exporting a Conflict Model
as JSON.
Figure 35: Importing a Conflict Model
into the Visualizer.
Figure 36: GMCR+ Visualizer Web
Application .
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